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Archive for December 2008

Judge Sheila McGinnis to Plead Guilty to DUI

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Cook County Judge Sheila McGinnis’ attorney revealed in court that she plans to plead guilty to drunken driving. According to a Sun-Times report her attorney, Jeff Aprati, told Judge Ed Burmila, during a hearing December 12, 2008, at the Markham Courthouse that McGinnis will plead guilty to the DUI on Jan. 20, Judge McGinnis, assigned to Bridgeview courthouse refused to take a Breathalyzer test when she crashed her 2004 Chevrolet Trailblazer into the back of a family of five’s minivan in Tinley Park on May 9. She has been re-assigned to a desk job since her arrest. Possible sentences include up to a year in jail.

This latest incident proves to me that Judge McGinnis does not have the temperment or self-control to be a judge. I have personally observed her demeanor and conduct on the bench and find her to be arrogant, incompetent in having a poor understanding of legal principles, and unwilling to hear pro se defendants. More later.

Of note: The husband of Judge McGinnis also named McGinnis is a relative of Mayor Daley and was on a  panel informed of the illegal hirings at city hall by Sorich.

http://www.suntimes.com/news/hired/31458,cst-nws-hired241.article

Judge McGinnis plead guilty on January 20, 2009 to DUI. She had refused to take a field sobriety test. She was fined $1000 and sentenced to 18 mo probation. She will now be referred to the Judicial Inquiry Board who should refer her case to the Judicial Commission for disciplinary action.

Written by Linda Shelton

December 17, 2008 at 12:38 pm

Illegal Political Trials (Hits) – Alive and Well in Illinois

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Protecting Defendants Charged for Political Reasons

SUPREME COURT JUSTICE DOUGLAS IN 1970 – “Does the answer to the problem of political trials involve defining the procedure for conducting political trials or does it involve the designing of constitutional methods for putting an end to them? . . . . It will be time enough to resolve those weighty problems when a political trial reaches this Court for review.”

THE TIME MAY BE NOW!

The State of Illinois through first Attorney General Jim Ryan and now Attorney General Lisa Madigan along with incompetent, ignorant, and/or corrupt officials in Illinois Medicaid including Bill Bradley, Investigator Reibel in the State Police, and Patrick Keenan in the State Police Medicaid Fraud Control Unit, with tacit approval by many other corrupt officials in the State of Illinois, have perpetrated a scheme for ten years to deny mental health services for persons on Medicaid in violation of the Federal Medicaid Code. See my other posts on Medicaid at:
http://illinoiscorruption.blogspot.com/2008/10/criminal-scheme-of-il-attorney-general.html.

In order to falsely advertise that she is “tough on fraud” so that she can advance her personal political ambitions, Lisa Madigan continues to fraudulently and without legal authorization indict outstanding providers of mental health services to Medicaid patients. Judges Schultz, Fox, Pantle, Alonso, and others have participated in these void and illegal prosecutions and done great harm to the citizens of Illinois in their illegal acts of violation the United States Constitution, in aiding and abetting this violation of federal law and civil rights.

I have been one of the persons illegally indicted and defamed, presently awaiting trial over a period of four long years. The harm to me, my patients, and my family is immeasurable and painful. I have persistly legally and appropriately through the legal process of at first representing myself and filing scholarly motions proving that higher court precedence (stare decisis) does NOT PERMIT this kind of persecution for political gain, and that my case is null and void ab initio (from the start).

I have been punished for vigorously advocating for my constitutional rights to redress of grievances and due process (including the right not to be tried for something that is not a crime) for four years with four incarcerations for contempt (two thrown out by the Illinois Appellate Court – pepetrated by Dishonorable Judge Pantle), one presently before Hon. Judge Coar in federal district court on a habeas corpus petition (asking the court to vacate and expunge the conviction on the basis of violation of constitutional rights and voidness – pepetrated by Dishonorable Judge Pantle), and one in limbo – dismissed for want of prosecution, but potentially can reinvigorate the appeal later (perpetrated by Dishonorable Judge Alonso).

I have been beaten, tortured, and medically neglected during these incarcerations and when I protested, a correctional officer, Sgt. Anthony Salemi, came into my cell and committed assault and battery against me. He falsified his records and I was charged and convicted of aggravated battery to an officer for allegedly “ramming him with my wheelchair” causing a skinned shin, and “kicking him in the chest with my RIGHT leg” causing soreness. This was impossible for me to do do to a partial RIGHT hemiparesis and extreme weakness secondary to dehydration caused by mendical neglect. I was sentenced to two years despite no criminal record and was released from Dwight penitentiary after being tortured on March 31, 2008. I was punished and placed in solitary confinement for 6 months because I refused to walk (I was unable to due to my disability) and forced to swim in my diarrhea on a 2 inch mattress with no sheets or clothes for days, except for a roughly quilted velcro smock and blanket, without toilet paper, without water (I was too week to get myself up to the water fountain at the sink or the toilet). The United States Attorney has been informed and so far has done NOTHING! My weight dropped from 171 lbs to 127 lbs and by the time I was released I couldn’t even sit up because of severe dehydration, and electrolyte imbalance. I was immediately taken to an emergency room and treated. The incompetent and barbaric sadists and psychopaths in Dwight’s medical department had insisted I was faking my medical problems.

Due to my protests, all reasonable and responsible and polite, I have been illegally and immoraly denied self-representation by Judges Pantle and now Alonso without legal authority in violation of my constitutional rights. I am being prosecuted for political reasons as a whistle blower. I testified against now convict and ex-Governor George Ryan in a class action suit for illegally denying 73 million dollars in funds for the care of handicapped children. I have won suits against Sheriff Sheahan in C[r]ook County for violating the American with Disabilities Act. I have won suits against the State of Illinois for failing to investigate barbaric and illegal abuse of mental health patients/inmates at Cook County Jail, and I have numerous pro se civil rights, mandamus, and injuctive suits pending in federal and state court against these corrupt officials. I am a target of the corrupt cabal in Illinois and C[r]ook County.

Justice Douglas in Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S.337 wrote the following in a concurring opinion, which is very much on point. My case is ripe for Hon. Juge Coar to address in this manner in the federal district court. It is a political case! This quote, by Justice Douglas in his opinion, about Penn is fascinating and you everyone should enjoy it!.

HOWEVER IT IS SAD THAT IN THE 21ST CENTURY IN ILLINOIS, CITIZENS WHO ARE DOING NOTHING BUT PROVIDING MUCH NEEDED MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES TO THE NEEDY, WHO HAVE DEVOTED THEIR LIVES TO SERVICE, AND WHO VALUE OUR CONSTITUTION, ARE STILL THE TARGET OF POLITICAL ATTACKS IN A MOST VICIOUS AND BRUTAL MANNER!

THIS IS WHY I ASK FOR THE HELP OF THE PUBLIC TO FUND MY DEFENSE AND TO HELP ME CONTINUE TO HELP OTHERS DEFEND THE CONSTITUTION. See link at the right on this blog if you wish to help.
________________________________________________________________________
QUOTED FROM CONCURRING OPINTION BY JUSTICE DOUGLAS IN ILLINOIS V. ALLEN, 397 U.S. 337 (1970):

Our real problems of this type lie not with this case, but with other kinds of trials. First are the political trials. They frequently recur in our history, [Footnote 2/2] and, insofar as they take place in federal courts, we have broad supervisory powers over them. That is one setting where the question arises whether the accused has rights of confrontation that the law invades at its peril.

In Anglo-American law, great injustices have at times been done to unpopular minorities by judges, as well as by prosecutors. I refer to London in 1670, when William Penn, the gentle Quaker, was tried for causing a riot when all that he did was to preach a sermon on Grace Church Street, his church having been closed under the Conventicle Act:

“Penn. I affirm I have broken no law, nor am I Guilty of the indictment that is laid to my charge, and to the end the bench, the jury, and myself, with these that hear us, may have a more direct understanding of this procedure, I desire you would let me know by what law it is you prosecute me, and upon what law you ground my indictment.”

“Rec. Upon the common law.”

“Penn. Where is that common law?”

“Rec. You must not think that I am able to run up so many years, and over so many adjudged cases, which we call common law, to answer your curiosity.”

“Penn. This answer I am sure is very short of my question, for if it be common, it should not be so hard to produce.”

“Rec. Sir, will you plead to your indictment?”

“Penn. Shall I plead to an Indictment that hath no foundation in law? If it contain that law you say I have broken, why should you decline to produce that law, since it will be impossible for the jury to determine, or agree to bring in their verdict, who have not the law produced by which they should measure the truth of this indictment, and the guilt, or contrary of my fact? ”

“Rec. You are a saucy fellow; speak to the Indictment.”

“Penn. I say, it is my place to speak to matter of law; I am arraigned a prisoner; my liberty, which is next to life itself, is now concerned: you are many mouths and ears against me, and if I must not be allowed to make the best of my case, it is hard, I say again, unless you shew me, and the people, the law you ground your indictment upon, I shall take it for granted your proceedings are merely arbitrary.”

“Rec. The question is whether you are Guilty of this Indictment?”

“Penn. The question is not whether I am Guilty of this Indictment, but whether this Indictment be legal. It is too general and imperfect an answer, to say it is the common law unless we knew both where and what it is. For where there is no law, there is no transgression, and that law which is not in being is so far from being common that it is no law at all.”

“Rec. You are an impertinent fellow, will you teach the court what law is? It is ‘Lex non scripta,’ that which many have studied 30 or 40 years to know, and would you have me to tell you in a moment?”

“Penn. Certainly, if the common law be so hard to be understood, it is far from being very common; but if the lord Coke in his Institutes be of any consideration, he tells us, That Common Law is common right, and that Common Right is the Great Charter-Privileges”

“Rec. Sir, you are a troublesome fellow, and it is not for the honour of the court to suffer you to go on. ”

“Penn. I have asked but one question, and you have not answered me; though the rights and privileges of every Englishman be concerned in it.”

“Rec. If I should suffer you to ask questions till tomorrow morning, you would be never the wiser.”

“Penn. That is according as the answers are.”

“Rec. Sir, we must not stand to hear you talk all night.”

“Penn. I design no affront to the court, but to be heard in my just plea: and I must plainly tell you that, if you will deny me Oyer of that law, which you suggest I have broken, you do at once deny me an acknowledged right, and evidence to the whole world your resolution to sacrifice the privileges of Englishmen to your sinister and arbitrary designs.”

“Rec. Take him away. My lord, if you take not some course with this pestilent fellow to stop his mouth, we shall not be able to do anything tonight.”

“Mayor. Take him away, take him away, turn him into the bale-dock. [Footnote 2/3]”

The Trial of William Penn, 3 How.St.Tr. 951, 958-959.

The panel of judges who tried William Penn were sincere, law-and-order men of their day. Though Penn was acquitted by the jury, he was jailed by the court for his contemptuous conduct. Would we tolerate removal of a defendant from the courtroom during a trial because he was insisting on his constitutional rights, albeit vociferously, no matter how obnoxious his philosophy might have been to the bench that tried him? Would we uphold contempt in that situation?

Problems of political indictments and of political judges raise profound questions going to the heart of the social compact. For that compact is two-sided: majorities undertake to press their grievances within limits of the Constitution and in accord with its procedures; minorities agree to abide by constitutional procedures in resisting those claims.

Does the answer to that problem involve defining the procedure for conducting political trials or does it involve the designing of constitutional methods for putting an end to them? This record is singularly inadequate to answer those questions. It will be time enough to resolve those weighty problems when a political trial reaches this Court for review.
_______________________________________________
[Footnote 2/2]
From Spies v. People, 122 Ill. 1, 12 N.E. 865, involving the Haymarket riot; In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564, involving the Pullman strike; Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103, involving the copper strikes of 1917; Commonwealth v. Sacco, 255 Mass. 369, 151 N.E. 839, 259 Mass. 128, 156 N.E. 57, 261 Mass. 12, 158 N.E. 167, involving the Red scare of the 20’s; to Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494, involving an agreement to teach Marxism.

As to the Haymarket riot resulting in the Spies case, see 2 J. Commons and Associates, History of Labour in the United States 386 et seq. (1918); W. Swindler, Court and Constitution in the Twentieth Century, cc. 3 and 4 (1969).

As to the Pullman strike and the Debs case, see L. Pfeffer, This Honorable Court 215-216 (1965); A. Lindsey, The Pullman Strike, cc. XII and XIII (1942); Commons, supra, at 502-508.

As to the Mooney case, see the January 18, 1922, issue of The New Republic; R. Frost, The Mooney Case (1968).

As to the Sacco-Vanzetti case, see Fraenkel, The Sacco-Vanzetti Case; F. Frankfurter, The Case of Sacco and Vanzetti (1927).

As to the repression of teaching involved in the Dennis case, see O. Kirchheimer, Political Justice 132-158 (1961).

[Footnote 2/3]
At Old Bailey, where the William Penn trial was held, the baledock (or baildock) was “a small room taken from one of the corners of the court, and left open at the top, in which, during the trials, are put some of the malefactors.”

Oxford Eng. Dict.

Confirmatory Bias and Harassment of Intelligent, Intense, Activists, and Pro Se Litigants – Shelton Judge’s Manual Part I

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Judges in the Circuit Court of Cook County have great difficulty understanding how to interact with very intelligent, overly enthusiastic, self-made “legal experts”, activists, and pro se litigants. They tend to make irrational knee-jerk assumptions about such litigants and order knee-jerk fitness exams will nilly, and often illegally, without basis. Perhaps some judges should be charged with practicing medicine without a license.

They are very arrogant and end up being quite unfair due to their confirmatory bias. Confirmatory bias is when a person has preconceived ideas that taint their interaction with the person. In this case their ego will not allow them to acknowledge a non-attorney quoting cases or statutes which they either are not aware of or do not understand. They fail to acknowledge to themselves that they are NOT omnipotent repositories of all law, that they are ignorant of much law and rely on the attorneys to educate them on areas where they are weak through motions quoting case law. This is why they “defend” their egos and arrogance with “shoot-from-the-hip” irrational and unconstitutional rulings in fits of unconscious emotion. They unconsciously, through arrogance, ignorance, and inexperience, selectively listen to and absorb only misinterpreted facts and unverified hearsay that support this bias. This is the nature of the beast called confirmatory bias. Once a judge recognizes and understands this, he is better able to keep it in check.

MY RECOMMENDATION TO THE JUDGES IS TO BACK OFF, TAKE A DEEP BREATH, AND QUESTION WHETHER HE REALLY UNDERSTANDS THE ISSUES OF THE CASE OR ARE SUBJECT TO EMOTION AND CONFIRMATORY BIAS WHEN CONFRONTED WITH A VERBOSE, EMOTIONAL, INTELLECTUAL, OVERLY ENTHUSIASTIC DEFENDANT. MAYBE HE HAS SOMETHING IMPORTANT TO SAY BUT THE JUDGE CAN’T SEE THE FOREST AMONG ALL THE TREES THE DEFENDANT IS POINTING OUT. IT IS THE JUDGE’S JOB AS A JUDGE TO TAKE CONTROL OF AND CLARIFY THIS EXCEEDINGLY (TO THE JUDGE) ANNOYING SITUATION.

There is a great mismatch between the style of judges/attorneys and physicians. Judges/attorneys are taught to narrow the issues and make statements using the least words. Decisions are based on as few issues as possible. Physicians are taught to cover every issue (don’t miss a possible diagnosis in their differential and see the global health of the person). Self-taught legal experts tend to have difficulty with prioritizing issues and consider everything exceedingly relevant. When physicians are wronged they tend to mix together the two issues of criminal law and civil law. In a criminal case they will try to discuss every irrelevent but connected issue so, as they perceive, the “court” will understand motive and circumstance. They are not aware that the “court” doesn’t care about motive and circumstance in all its details but just wants to limit the testimony and discovery to issues concerning elements of a crime. They are not aware that criminal courts are not the place to litigate torts or air grievances.

Judges/attorneys falsely believe that every pro se litigant is a rambling, irrational, incoherent nut. Therefore, they don’t even try to listen to or read the pleadings of a pro se physician or self-taught, ragged, and, to the uninformed and unwilling to listen, seemingly confused “legal expert” no matter how factual and accurate their statements and arguments may be, hidden among the chaffe. It is simply too much for their inflated egos to handle. Instead through confirmatory bias the judge will immediately order a fitness exam and ignore the defendant.

Judges simply do not comprehend the fact that many defendants are “normal” but on the fringe in terms of extremely adamant positions on social and civil rights issues. For example: Rosa Parks, Martin Luther King, Ghandhi, anti-war protesters, civil rights activists are not all mentally ill. They are just determined, passionate, and adamant. Failure to accommodate these people in the courts, treating them like raving maniacs, harassing them and defaming them is a great injustice. The courts should have RESPECT and TOLERANCE for defendants with extreme and adamant social viewpoints.

Fitness for trial has a very low bar. All that is needed is an understanding of the players (what is a judge, jury, etc., and what do they do), the charge, the possible sentences, and the consequences of conviction, as well as an ability to interact with his attorney or tell the story and answer questions in some meaningful but minimal fashion. The defendant can be florridly psychotic, but if he meets these criteria he is legally “fit” although mentally ill. A full mental health evaluation is not necessary to make this basic determination regarding fitness.

In fact it is a gross waste of resources to constantly refer defendants who are clearly fit to forensic clinical services (a department with notoriously incompetent and arrogant psychiatrists who blanketly deny even the defendants’s request to tape record or write down the interview on paper, which denies the defendant a record of the interview to have another psychiatrist of his choosing review for accuracy of the diagnosis – even the Supreme Court has implied through dicta that it is not unreasonable to record the interview – and professional psychiatric organization ethical rules do not bar such a recording).

For the judges to constantly defer to the Director of Forensic Clinical Services in Cook County’s Dr. Markos’ innane rule barring any recording and other psychiatrist’s self-serving (to prevent proof of their malpractice, which shouldn’t be a concern as they have total immunity from malpractice torts) rule of not even allowing note-taking by the defendant is obscene in my view and firmly denies the write to confrontation when information from the interview is used against a person regarding sanity.

I recommend that judges when faced with a verbose, overly intense and emotional intellect in a defendant, especially a physician, should satisfy their curiosity about defendant’s fitness by asking some simple question and making the following statement to inform the person that courts are apples compared to the oranges in the practice of medicine (or other professional field) in the way they approach issues.

“I am going to give you some basic instruction about courtroom procedure and how attorneys and judges approach the practice of law to make your hearings run smoothly. I am not here to solve your personal issues regarding retaliation against you or harassment of you by rightful or wrongful conduct of others against you. The purpose of this court is to decide if you committed a crime. A crime is defined by elements. For example with the crime of trespass the State only has to prove you were told to leave a place and you refused to leave. Some crimes require that the element called intent also be proven such as in the crime of criminal contempt. Any arguments between you and the owner of the place on a trespass charge are irrelevant to the determination of you innocence or guilt. They may however later be introduced at the sentencing hearing if you are found guilty as mitigating or aggravating factors. For the same reason, this court will find irrelevant and not allow the introduction at trial of any factors that occurred before or after this incident of an alleged crime. The issues in criminal court are narrowed to the elements of the crime and I will not allow this court’s time to be wasted or the court to be distracted by irrelevant materials. Many pro se defendants have difficulty understanding the concept of relevance, and the concept of elements of a crime. Please think about these issues carefully and how your defenses will address them when you present evidence or witness testimony. The court does recognize that under unusual circumstances factors that may superficially seem irrelevant may be actually relevant. Therefore, for purposes of efficiency and judicial economy, I ask both sides to put these issues in writing in a motion for leave to present them at trial.”

This would be a start in ending the war between pro se litigants who are not nuts (physicians, self taught “legal experts”, etc.) and moving cases along more efficiently and rationally. Careful thought by the judges about the above issues may reduce bias and allow cases to proceed more efficiently and smoothly.

It is my hope that this web site and the companion sites:

http://illinoiscorruption.blogspot.com/ and

http://prosechicago.wordpress.com/

will be used both by judges/attorneys and the public (particularly pro se community) to reduce tempers, calm nerves, bring understanding, encourage justice, and move cases along more efficiently and less traumatically for all involved.

Behavioral Clinical Exam (BCX) or Exams to Determine Mental Fitness for Trial – Shelton Judge’s Manual – Part III

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AMICUS BRIEF OF LINDA SHELTON CONCERNING FITNESS EXAMS

             Non-Attorney and physician/scientist/civil rights activist/expert, Dr. Linda Shelton, respectfully offers to the court the following factual information, which supports defense motion to vacate the order of this court to raise bail for alleged violation of bail because defendant refused to answer questions at a BCX exam. This refusal to answer questions at the exam is defendant’s statutory right as follows

1.     Court determinations of fitness are made by a court hearing and not by the forensic examiner. The examiners report is merely evidence.

2.      Fitness by statute and case law is determined by the judge, if jury is waved, or the jury in a fitness hearing per 725 ILCS 5/104-11(c):

     (c) When a bonafide doubt of the defendant’s fitness has been raised, the burden of proving that the defendant is fit by a preponderance of the evidence and the burden of going forward with the evidence are on the State. However, the court may call its own witnesses and conduct its own inquiry. [emphasis added]

3. A fitness order is NOT evidence of a bonafide doubt per the First District Illinois Appellate Court in People v. Hill, 345 Ill.App.3d 620, 803 N.E.2d 138 (2003).

      [W]e find that the trial court’s decision to appoint an expert to examine a defendant has no bearing on the court’s ultimate conclusion as to whether a bona fide doubt as to the defendant’s fitness to stand trial has been raised.

4. A Court may order a fitness exam if there is a bonafide doubt of defendant’s fitness per 725 ILCS 5/104-11. This doubt must be specific and not a general statement and must be expressed in open court on the record. It is not sufficient for a judge to state that a defendant’s behavior or writings suggest a fitness exam is needed. The judge must specify the nature of the behavior or the details in the writings that suggest fitness is absent. Absent such detail the order is insufficient.

5.      725 ILCS 5/104‑14(c) mandates that the Court inform the Defendant that he has a statutory right to refuse to answer questions at the BCX exam:

Use of Statements Made During Examination or Treatment.

(c) The court shall advise the defendant of the limitations on the use of any statements made or information gathered in the course of the fitness examination or subsequent treatment as provided in this Section. It shall also advise him that he may refuse to cooperate with the person conducting the examination, but that his refusal may be admissible into evidence on the issue of his mental or physical condition. [emphasis added]

 

6.      725 ILCS 5/104‑13(d) mandates that the Court MAY not revoke bail if the Defendant is ordered to undergo a BCX exam in order to accomplish the exam:

Fitness Examination. 


      (d) Release on bail or on recognizance shall not be revoked and an application therefor shall not be denied on the grounds that an examination has been ordered.

     7. Therefore, defendants have a statutory right to refuse to answer questions at a BCX exam and this act does not permit the Court to revoke or alter bail for violation of the condition of bail to appear at a BCX exam and answer questions.

8.      The report of the fitness examination ordered from Forensic Clinical Services is due within 30 days of the date of the order per 725 ILCS 5/104-15.

     9. The fitness hearing must be held within 45 days of receiving the report of the fitness exam, regardless of the results of the report per 725 ILCS 5/104-16:

      (a) The court shall conduct a hearing to determine the issue of the defendant’s   fitness within 45 days of receipt of the final written report of the person or persons conducting the examination or upon conclusion of the matter then pending before it.

     10. This Court must therefore schedule a fitness hearing in this case no later than 45 days after receipt of the report of the fitness exam received by the Court on November 25, 2008 (January 9, 2008).

     11. The details of the forensic examiner’s report have no bearing on scheduling the fitness hearing. A judge may not continue to re-order the BCX until he obtains a report of fitness or no fitness, in order to delay a hearing. The hearing is a statutory right.

     12. The defendant has a statutory right to continue to refuse to answer questions. In general if a defendant refuses to answer questions, it is futile to re-order the fitness exam. The result is that there will be no forensic examiner’s recommendation as to whether or not the defendant is fit. The fitness hearing will have to proceed without professional opinion based solely on other witnesses called by the court, which may include the transcript of statements made by the defendant and pleadings written by the defendant.

[T]he trial court’s decision to appoint an expert to examine a defendant has no bearing on the court’s ultimate conclusion as to whether a bona fide doubt as to the defendant’s fitness to stand trial has been raised. Hill 803 N.E. 2d 138, at 145.

     13. Courts may still determine fitness even though the forensic psychiatry examiner is unable to determine fitness based on defendant’s unwillingness to cooperate:

Courts determine fitness based on three factors: the defendant’s irrational behavior, the defendant’s demeanor at trial, and any prior medical opinion on the defendant’s competence to stand trial.  Hill 803 N.E. 2d 138, at 145.

 

 

Although the . . . [the expert] was not able to “come to [a] definitive opinion in regards to defendant’s fitness to stand trial,” this failure was due to defendant’s lack of cooperation. Hill 803 N.E. 2d 138, at 145.

 

The ultimate decision as to a defendant’s fitness must be made by the trial court, not the experts People v. Bilyew, 73 Ill.2d 294, 302 (1978) [emphasis added]

 

In Hill case the court concluded that the defendant was fit to stand trial. A previous, though not contemporously timely exam had determined defendant was mentally ill but fit to stand trial and the judge’s observations in court led him to conclude the defendant understood the players in the court and the charges against him.

 

While these reports provide some evidence of mental illness, they are insufficient to counter the several indications in the record that defendant understood and participated at trial . . . . [and] exhibited no irrational behavior.  Hill 803 N.E. 2d 138, at 146

 

14. The Illinois Supreme Court has repeatedly held that when determining whether a bona fide doubt of defendant’s fitness exists, courts should consider the following factors: the defendant’s irrational behavior, the defendant’s demeanor at trial and any prior medical opinion on the defendant’s competence to stand trial. People v. Harris, 206 Ill.2d 293, 304, 276 Ill.Dec. 286, 794 N.E.2d 181, 190 (2002).

15. Evidence presented at the fitness hearing may include a report from forensic clinical services, or from private psychiatrists and psychologists retained by either side. The report may state that the defendant is fit or unfit for trial and the examiners detailed reasoning and clinical judgment as to why he came to that conclusion, or may simply be a statement that the examiner was unable to make this determination at the exam because the defendant was unable or unwilling to cooperate with questions.

16.  Although the Cook County Court’s Forensic Clinical Services Department has made a policy that all BCX exams will be performed without video or audio recordings, or witnesses, there is NO absolute bar to recordings or witnesses (assuming they say nothing and merely observe) according to the ethical standards of the American Academy of Psychiatry or the American Academy of psychiatry and the law. In fact, despite the statements of Cook County Forensic Clinical Services in the past that witnesses interfere with the exam, it is known in psychiatry that silent witnesses may be helpful in order to gain the defendant’s cooperation with confused, mentally retarded, or unusually intelligent and court savvy individuals to permit recordings or witnesses in individual circumstances.

17.  The United States Supreme Court in Indiana v. Edwards (2008) went beyond Faretta and stated that even if a defendant is mentally fit to stand trial, the State may deny the defendant the right to self-representation on grounds that he is mentally not competent to represent himself to the point he would be denied a fair trial. They stated that mental illness is not a unitary or static concept and that the trial judge must carefully consider this issue. Yet they set NO guidelines as to the definition of mental competency to self-representation and specifically rejected Indiana’s blanket bar on self-representation if the court finds the defendant cannot “communicate coherently.”

18.  This poses a dilemma for the court as the court must itself determine mental competency for self-representation without any guidelines at present.

19.  I recommend that the court question the defendant on the record and determine: 1) if the defendant is able to formulate questions logically that address specific issues related to his case, 2) if the defendant understands the role of the players in the court as well as the charges against him and the possible sentence, 3) if the defendant is oriented as to time, place, and situation, 4) if the defendant expresses basic understanding of the concept of legal research and the significance of statutes, codes, and case law, and 5) if the defendant is able to control his behavior and emotions so that he can effectively listen, take notes, and formulate questions including questions to a stand-by counsel regarding courtroom procedure. If all of these issues are answered in the affirmative then the defendant should be considered mentally competent for purposes of self-representation.

20.  Unfortunately, courts are left to formulate criteria for mental competence for self-representation with the United States Supreme Court holding in abeyance further decisions upon the criteria for mental competence for self-representation until further cases reach the Court.

21.  Finally, I recommend that with very intelligent and legally savvy defendants who refuse too answer questions at a fitness exam because they feel, despite the Court’s dicta in Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981), that the defendant has no constitutional fifth amendment right to have a witness present during a fitness exam or a recording of the fitness exam, the Court should ask basic fitness questions on the record to prove the defendant has the mental understanding and lack of confusion necessary to stand trial including: 1) the date, time, place, and situation, 2) the role of the players in the court, 3) the nature of the charges against him, and 4) the possible sentence if convicted, as well as 5) the meaning of being convicted and sentenced.

22.  The answers to these questions can then be utilized by the court in lieu of a professional’s fitness exam report to determine the issue of fitness, but not the issue of mental illness. A professional forensic psychiatric exam is not really necessary to determine fitness, but is necessary to determine if the defendant suffers from mental illness.

                                                                        Respectfully submitted,

 

 

                                                                        Dr. Linda Shelton

Written by Linda Shelton

December 8, 2008 at 6:05 am

Illinois Supreme Court Violates Statutes and Their Oaths of Office – Corruption at Its Best!

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Illinois Supreme Court Upholds Judge Maddux’s Blatant Violation of Law

 

On November 26, 2008 the Illinois Supreme Court in a Motion for Leave to File Complaint for Mandamus with attached Complaint for Mandamus denied Leave to file without explanation.

This means that the Illinois Supreme Court has publicly condoned Judge Maddux’s violation of statutes that require a judge to grant a Petition for indigent status and waive filing fees for a tort (lawsuit) when a Plaintiff is indigent, as well as state specifically the reason that a petition for indigent status is denied.

See details of the illegal conduct and ruling by Judge Maddux in denying a Petition for Indigent Status. http://illinoiscorruption.blogspot.com/2008/10/crook-county-presiding-law-judge-maddux.html

In a similar case of a transgender person Ms. Daunn Turner in early 2008 the Illinois Supreme Court granted a complaint for mandamus when Will  County Circuit Court Judge Stephen White denied Ms. Turner’s Petition for Indigent Status solely because he stated that he will not allow the State to pay for her name change due to her sexual status. Ms. Turner was an accomplished individual who had become severely disabled and according to law therefore qualified for indigent status.
This upholding of blatant violation of statutes by J. Maddux is a disgrace upon the Illinois Supreme Court and reveals that corruption permiates the highest levels of the Courts in Illinois. These two issues were identical – failure of the judge and clerk to follow the law regarding indigent petitions. Yet the Court intervened on the Turner case and denied leave to file on the Shelton case. This is clear bias and failure to uphold the law. Clearly there is no justice and American Justice is a Myth when the Supreme Court of a State can blatantly violate clear cut statutes.

I will now take this to the U.S. Supreme Court for a supervisory order. They will probably deny review, thus condoning violation of statute and due process rights as well as violation of the First Amendment right to redress of grievances and access to the courts, as well as Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process.

Thus another example of [in]justice and the Myth of American Justice!

Judge William D. Maddux

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COOK COUNTY PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE LAW DIVISION WILLIAM D. MADDUX CONSISTENTLY AND PUPOSELY VIOLATES ILLINOIS STATUTES AND HIS OATH OF OFFICE IN DENYING PRO SE LITIGANTS’ INDIGENT PETITIONS (IN FORMA PAUPERIS PETITIONS).
HE SHOULD BE REMOVED FROM OFFICE FOR HIS ARROGANT, TYRANICAL, ILLEGAL, UNETHICAL, AND ATROCIOUS CONDUCT THAT VIOLATES CITIZENS’ FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS TO REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES AND FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS.
Pro se litigants in Chicago who are indigent and file petitions for indigent status to waive filing and copying fees are routinely denied this status illegally by Presiding Law Division Judge Maddux because Judge Maddux wants to inhibit access to courts to whistle blowers, civil rights activists, those filing multiple legitimate suits pro se, and those who have spoken out against corruption in the courts, police, and among elected officials. The courts in C[r]ook County are extremely corrupt.

He never reads the pleadings. His law clerk simply writes “denied due to inability to sue in good faith”.

Dorothy Brown, the court clerk refuses to accept complaints unless the judge approves an indigent petition or the plaintiff pays the filing fee.

The law REQUIRES that indigent status be granted if you can prove your assets are less than 125% of the poverty level and your complaint if not frivolous.

735 ILCS 5/5-105 [ILCS = Illinois Compiled Statutes]
“The clerk of the court shall not refuse to accept any complaint, appearance, or other paper presented by the applicant if accompanied by an application to sue or defend in forma pauperis, and those papers shall be considered filed on the date the application is presented.”

There is no requirement that the complaint must be approved by the Judge as legitimate. Courts however do have the power to issue sanctions for frivolous repeated suits.

The actions of Judge Maddux and Dorothy Brown in denying access to the courts are clearly illegal.

I invite others to inform me of their similar difficulties and join in a mandamus complaint against Judge Maddux and Clerk Brown to force them to comply with the statutes and IL Supreme Court Rule 298.

Written by Linda Shelton

December 6, 2008 at 1:38 pm

Judge Marie Kuriakos Ciesil

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On September 26, 2007 Judge Ciesil issued an arrest warrant for Linda Shelton at 9:05 a.m. for being late to a 10:00 a.m. court hearing. She was temporarily removed from her courtroom for this misconduct by Presiding Judge Wright, but is back at it again, acting incompetent. For more infor see:

     http://illinoiscorruption.blogspot.com/search/label/Judge%20Kuriakos%20Ciesil

On December 3, 2008 J. Ciesil illegally and unconstitutionally barred all non parties from the courtroom in a trial of Jose Rivas at her courtroom at 555 Harrison in Chicago. The people who wanted to enter the gallery were not disorderly in any way. This denial of a public trial is unconstitutional. She should be impeached for her pattern of unconstitutional acts. For more info see:

    ** in preparation**

Judge Thomas More Donnelly

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Judge Donnelly on September 25, 2008 charged Robert J. More with indirect criminal contempt for “practicing law without a license.” J. Donnelly claimed that Mr. More’s use of the “attorney code” 99500 on his pleadings was an act of impersonating a lawyer. The “attorney code” 99500 is the code the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County requires pro se litigants to use on the pleadings in the same way attorneys use their ARDC numbers on their pleadings. It is used 100s of times a month by pro se litigants in the court. Judge Donnelly is an idiot. The code 99500 is listed on the attorney appearance form provided by the clerk after the words “pro se.”

Judge Donnelly also granted the States motion to charge Mr. More with contempt for practicing law without a license because he filed an amicus curiae brief in a case of a friend. J. Donnelly stupidly states that only lawyers can file such briefs. Amicus Curiae means friend of the court. Apparently J. Donnelly does not understand that there are U.S. Supreme Court rules on how citizens (non-lawyers) must file amicus briefs including filing a motion for leave to file. It would be news to John E. Thorne a non-attorney that this is practicing law without a license. He filed an amicus brief before the U.S. Supreme Court in Faretta v. California in 1975, the landmark decision that affirmed that a person has a right to self-representation in the courts (i.e. Faretta rights).

Judge Donnelly is openly and grossly violating his oath of office in denying constitutional rights and in charging Mr. More with something that is NOT A CRIME! He should be removed form the bench or at least made to take a long leave of absence and read up on the law, as well as watch another judge for six months, and then be supervised for another six months. J. Donnelly is an example of why new judges should undergo a year of training and studying case law before they come on the bench. Ignorance in the face of power are a disasterous combination. One would never allow a new graduate of a medical school who is a licensed physician to perform brain surgery without many years of additional training as a brain surgeon!  How is being a judge any different?

I give judge Donnelly credit that upon a motion to dismiss the criminal contempt charges for failure to state a crime he acknowledged that Mr. More showed no intent to denigrate or interfere with the court by filing an amicus brief. J. Donnelly acknowledge that the charging instrument, the petition for adjudication of criminal contempt was devoid of any suggestion there was intent by Mr. More to insult the court, denigrate the court, show disrespect to the court, or interfere with the court. Criminal contempt is an intent crime and therefore, the complaint is void if no intent is alleged. Judge Donnelly then granted the motion to dismiss for failure to state a crime.

Judge Donnelly also acknowledged that he had ordered a BCX (fitness exam) on Mr. More and then rescinded this order. Mr. More’s attorney, recently hired because the court refused to let Mr. More represent himself in violation of Faretta (self-representation rights) and the public defender just didn’t have time to do a proper job on this case, made a motion to vacate a recent order irrationally raising bail when Mr. More refused to answer questions at the BCX exam without having it recorded in some fashion. J. Donnelly had in violation of statutes said this was a violation of bail and issued an arrest warrent for Mr. More, which was executed and he ended up briefly in jail. The statutes state that the judge SHALL inform a defendant, when the court orders a BCX, that the defendant has the RIGHT to refuse to answer questions at the exam. It also says the court may not alter bail orders to accomplish a BCX exam. Therefore, J. Donnelly’s arrest warrant and order to raise bail were a violation of statute and a violation of his oath of office to uphold the law. Statutory construction laws state that no word in a statute is superfluous. The word SHALL attaches to the law a statutory right. Although J. Donnelly made a proper ruling in vacating his illegal orders in this regard, he rambled excessively in trying to save face stating falsely that this was not a statutory right and that he was only vacating the order because he had previously vacated the order for the BCX. Properly he also ordered the entire bail to be returned to Mr. More which prevents the clerk from retaining her usual 10 % fee (the reason bails are so excessively high in Cook County – the court uses this in a racket to fund the clerk’s office – high bails increase the clerk’s 10% fees – which I believe should be declared unconstitutional just like the feds saying that tying services to a hospital to fees for patients by charging by % of the doctor’s or hospital’s revenues instead of by the number of services provided [no of bills processed or number of sheets cleaned for example] is Medicaid fraud – why should the biller get $5,000 to process one neurosurgical bill, but $10 to process one pediatrician’s bill?).

Judge Donnelly also presided over the trial of Robert More on a charge of criminal trespass to state supported land (a class A misdemeanor) illegally amended as ordered by J. Donnelly to trespass to real property (a class B misdemeanor). Mr. More was arrested about six months ago when he went to the Daley Center for a hearing on a lawsuit which he filed. He went to court at the appropriate time at about 10 a.m. The judge had left the bench and no one was in the courtroom except for the court clerk and the Sheriff’s deputy. Mr. More asked the court clerk when his case was being heard, as he was surprised to see no one in the courtroom and the judge NOT on the bench. Generally courtrooms at the Daley Center are open during normal business hours and attorneys will go in and leave courtesy copies of motions or solve schedule conflicts with the clerks. When a case is over and an attorney realizes something wasn’t addressed they may go to the clerk and ask for the case to be “recalled”. Then the clerk goes to the judges chambers and requests the judge to recall the case. The judge comes on the bench and attends to the pending legal issue or the request by the attorney to “reconsider” a matter that may have already been ruled upon. The judge MAY tell the attorney to file a motion to reconsider and schedule it up with the clerk’s office.

Mr. More simply requested the clerk to recall the case and the deputy and clerk told him that the court was “down” for the day. Perhaps county taxpayers should therefore only pay this judge for a 1/2 of a day’s work! Mr. More politely and repeatedly stated that he wanted to hear from the judge as the deputy and clerk had no authority to dismiss the case and he wanted the judge to hear him and reconsider the issue. The clerk should have gone and told the judge Mr. More was requesting the case recalled. The judge, if he wasn’t corrupt, incompetent, or unethical, should have merely come on the bench told Mr. More he made a sue sponte decision and if he wanted it reconsidered he should file a written formal motion and schedule it with the clerk to be heard. The judge also could have written such an order and after he signed it delivered it to Mr. More. It is INAPPROPRIATE and DISCIMINATORY to treat Mr. More as a pro se counsel different than the way a licensed attorney is treated by the Clerk. If the judge feels that Mr. More’s lawsuits are duplicative, abusive, frivolous, or otherwise, the judge can issue sanctions that his suits have to be approved by the chief judge or something like that or eliminated his indigent standing.

The deputy asked Mr. More to leave and said he should go to another floor to the clerk’s office and ask his questions as the court was “down.” Mr. More knew his constitutional rights to access the courts. The court should have been open during normal business hours. The judge should have issued an order or come on the bench concerning Mr. More’s request to recall the case. Mr. More’s constitutional rights were vioalted.

The Deputy, Datullo, a short busty young meek white female, testified that Mr. More was sitting in the back bench quietly waiting to be heard. She said she told him the court was “down”, but that he kept approaching the clerk and trying to hand her papers (presumably pleadings of some kind to get the case recalled). She said she called her supervisor who came and arrested Mr. More for trespass to state supported land.

Deputy Datullo clearly lied when she said that Mr. More said “I’m not leaving unless I’m arrested.” Sgt. Griffith’s (black female, obese sgt.) had written an incident report which stated that Mr. More said that if the sgt. told him he would be arrested if he didn’t leave, then he would leave. Obviously, he was trying to preserve his right to access to the courts and documents the officers’ interference with his access to the courts as well as the clerk’s interference with his access to the courts.

Deputy Datullo testified that she had 14 weeks training as a deputy and 1 week a year. She testified that she was NOT trained in what constitutes the elements of the crime trespass. She also admitted that she never TOLD Mr. More to leave, but just asked him to leave by telling him the court was “down”. Her incident report contained NO STATEMENT that she told Mr. More to leave. She admitted she never COMMANDED him to leave.

Deputy Datullo sounded unsure and confused on the stand, spoke in a shy and tentative voice and kept waffling about what she said to Mr. More.

Sgt. Griffith’s incident report contained NO language that she TOLD Mr. More to leave. It stated that she told him that he should go to the clerk’s office to handle his affairs. It said that Mr. More wanted to see the judge. She said “there’s nothing that can be done.”

The deputies are NOT trained judges or court clerks and have no right in telling citizens what are legal procedures. She admitted that when Mr. More stated that he would leave if she said “you will be arrested if you dont’ leave”, she told him to stand up and arrested him.

Sgt. Griffith falsely stated that there was no clerk and no other lawyers in the courtroom. Even Datullo testified that the clerk was present. Mr. More maintains two other lawyers were in the courtroom at one time – perhaps before Sgt. Griffith arrived?

Sgt. Griffith stated that she had 14 weeks training at the academy and was trained in general aspects of criminal law, but was not trained in the elements of trespass or in the crime of trespass.

During cross-examination she changed much of what she had testified in direct examination by stating that now she “doesn’t recall.” Sgt. Griffith was firm and authoritative on the stand, although her story changed while she was testifying. She even had an annoying arrogant demeanor where she tended to smirk about the incident.

Sgt. Griffith at first falsely testified that she arrested Mr. More immediately after he told her he “wouldn’t leave unless he was arrested.” She was impeached by her own incident report. Then she falsely testified that she “gave him time to leave before she arrested him.”

Unfortunately, it is likely that Sgt. Griffith will not be charged with perjury, although it is clear that is what she knowingly committed. Perhaps her only saving grace is that because of blistering cross examination by attorney J. Nicolas Albukerk, she finally admitted that she “didn’t recall” the events alleged.

Judge Donnelly is grossly ignorant of law and unable to interpret case law and statutory law properly. Although his decision on Mr. More being not guilty with a directed verdict was correct, he should have dismissed the case as failure to state a crime and NOT allowed this illegal amendment changing the charge to criminal trespass to real property for the following reasons:

Legislative intent did not mean to allow officers to arrest people on public property for trespass to real property. Citizens should be allowed to come into public buildings not just to obtain services but to observe the functioning of government including being spectators at public trials (a constitutional right under the Sixth Amendment). The crime trespass to real property requires that a person be told to leave the property by the “owner or occupant” but refuses to leave. The crime trespass to state supported land required the person be told to leave the property by the “State or its representative” and that the person “interferes with a persons use or lawful enjoyment of the building or land.” A State or its representative IS NOT an owner or occupant. Therefore the elements of the crime and facts of these two crimes are different.

720 ILCS 5/21‑3
Sec. 21‑3. Criminal trespass to real property.
(a) Except as provided in subsection (a‑5), whoever:
(1) knowingly and without lawful authority enters or remains
within or on a building; or
(2) enters upon the land of another, after receiving, prior to such
entry, notice from the owner or occupant that such entry is forbidden;
or
(3) remains upon the land of another, after receiving notice from the
owner or occupant to depart; or
. . .
For purposes of item (1) of this subsection, this Section shall not
apply to being in a building which is open to the public while the building
is open to the public during its normal hours of operation; nor shall this
Section apply to a person who enters a public building under the
reasonable belief that the building is still open to the public.

720 ILCS 5/21‑5) (from Ch. 38, par. 21‑5)
Sec. 21‑5. Criminal Trespass to State Supported Land.
(a) Whoever enters upon land supported in whole or in part with State
funds, or Federal funds administered or granted through State agencies or
any building on such land, after receiving, prior to such entry, notice from
the State or its representative that such entry is forbidden, or remains
upon such land or in such building after receiving notice from the State or
its representative to depart, and who thereby interferes with another
person’s lawful use or enjoyment of such building or land, commits a Class
A misdemeanor.

The law does not allow a charge with different elements to be amended to a different charge. Statutes only allow certain kinds of amendments of charges and amending a charge of trespass to state supported land to a charge of trespass to real property is not allowed!

Also, all charges due to one incident must be brought (joined) at the same time. Charges cannot be added after 160 days. In Mr. More’s case the charge of trespass to state supported land was void for failure to state a crime. The charging instrument – the complaint – failed to state the second element that he interrupted someone’s use of the building. Therefore the charge was void and should have been dismissed by the judge on the defense motion to dismiss for failure to state a charge.

Instead J. Donnelly through his ignorance and incompetence allowed the state to illegally “amend” the complaint, changing the facts and the elements, to the charge of trespass to real property. If the trespass to state supported land was dismissed, then the state had 160 days to decide to bring the new charge of trespass to real property. As it was over 160 days when they chose to amend the complaint illegally, it technically was illegal for them to bring this new charge. The judge should NOT have allowed the amendment. The case should have been over at that point and there should have been NO trial. J. Donnelly wasted county funds by holding a trial and wasted the juror’s time.

Delays caused by defendant on original charges cannot be applied to new charges brought at a date later than date original charges brought. Speedy trial for new charges for same offense are required to be joined to original charges by 720 ILCS 5/3-3 (West 2004). Speedy trial statute 725 5/103-5 (a) (West 2004). New charges home invasion dismissed on speedy trial grounds even though new charges brought within 120 days (in custody) on day 116 after arrest, when trial occurred 149 days after arrest. To allow new charges in violation of speedy trial statute would “allow trial by ambush” per the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Williams, 204 Ill.2d 191 (2003) “The State could lull the defendant into acquiescing to pretrial delays on pending charges, while it prepared for a trial on more serious, not-yet-pending charges We cannot presume that a defendant would have agreed to a continuance if he had faced both charges. As Justice Kuehn presciently observed, ‘All choices about requests that would delay proceedings would be made under a false understanding as a result of this deception.’ When the State filed the more serious charges, the defendant would face a Hobson’s choice between a trial without adequate preparation and further pretrial detention to prepare for trial. Today, we do not create a loophole for criminal defendants. Instead, we close a loophole which would allow the State to circumvent a statutorily implemented constitutional right.” Williams, 204 Ill.2d at 207, quoting People v. Williams, No 5-99-0452 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23 (Kuehn, J, dissenting). People v. [Jimmy] Boyd, _______________________ 2nd Dist IL App

It simply was illegal for the judge to allow an amendment from trespass to state supported land to trespass to real property.

725 ILCS 5/111‑5
Sec. 111‑5. Formal defects in a charge.
An indictment, information or complaint which charges the commission of an offense in accordance with Section 111‑‑3 of this Code shall not be dismissed and may be amended on motion by the State’s Attorney or defendant at any time because of formal defects, including:
(a) Any miswriting, misspelling or grammatical error;
(b) Any misjoinder of the parties defendant;
(c) Any misjoinder of the offense charged;
(d) The presence of any unnecessary allegation;
(e) The failure to negative any exception, any excuse or proviso contained in the statute defining the offense; or
(f) The use of alternative or disjunctive allegations as to the acts, means, intents or results charged.

Mr. More obtained the right result – acquittal, but he actually should have had the case dismissed due to failure to state a crime, which therefore renders the case null and void ab initio. Only J. Donnelly’s ignorance and arrogance prevented this earlier outcome.

I hate to criticize judges without stating observations about their talents and skills. I do want to complement J. Donnelly on his statements to the jury. He is patient, calm, humerous, and respectful with the jury. His voice is easy to understand. His statements are clear. He has the potential to be a very good judge.  However his understanding and interpretation of case law is marginal at best.  He needs to do a lot more studying in this regard and needs supervision in this regard by a senior judge. I wish him well and really hope he reads this blog.

Judge Kathleen Pantle

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On December 8, 2005 Judge Kathleen Pantle issued an arrest warrant for Linda Shelton for not showing up for a court date on a case where Shelton is fraudulently alleged to have committed Medicaid Vendor Fraud. Shelton had informed J. Pantle in writing that she was in federal court before Judge Filip arguing her habeas corpus petition where J. Pantle was the respondent on that day. J. Filip had told Shelton through his courtroom deputy that when a judge schedules a court date that conflicts with another court date, that the defendant will not be arrested if the judge is informed in writing. Shelton was taken into custody on December 15, 2005 and wrongfully incarcerated until December 30, 2005 with an unconstitutional and excessive NO BAIL order, raised form a $10,000 personal recognizance bail. She was released on December 30, 2005 after the Illinois Appellate Court reduced her bail to a $10,000 personal recognizance bond. For further info see:

     **post in preparation**

On January 6, 2005, Judge Panatle raised bail on Linda Shelton in above case to an excessive bail of $500,000 from a $10,000 personal recognizance bond set by the Illinois Appellate Court with a false statement that Shelton had “lied” to the Illinois Appellate Court to have her bail reduced. The Illinois Appellate Court then again reduced the bail on January 20, 2005 to $100,000 and Shelton was released on bail. The Illinois Appellate Court and Judicial Inquiry Board have FAILED to reprimand or discipline in any manner J. Pantle’s unconstitional, vindictive, illegal, and unethical orders that violate her oath of office and bring the cout into disrepute for ignoring orders of the Illinois Appellate Court. This was also an unconstitutional incarceration as it was done without formal charge of violation of bail and only on the word of the J. Pantle without counsel or presence of Shelton in the courtroom that Shelton had “lied” to the Appellate Court and refused to answer questions at a fitness exam (a statutory right). This was an illegal penalty on Shelton’s exercise of her constitutional right to seek a habeas corpus writ and her right to refuse to answer questions at a fitness exam because she considered the order void and the underlying case void ab initio. Judge Coar in federal court is  presently considering the issue of voidness of the underlying case which has yet to go to trial in federal court in a renewed habeas corpus petition. J. Pantle was removed from the criminal court and transferred to Chancery Court.

Pro Se litigants now routinely request substitution of the judge as a right whenever they are assigned to Judge Pantle due to the above reputation.

Judge Pantle is unethical, violates the constitution and statutes of this state, violates her oath of office, is arrogant and incompetent, as well as vindictive and retaliatory when a pro se litigant informs her of the law, and should be impeached for her continuing and blatant misconduct on the bench. She has virtually no or very little understanding of the fitness statutes, speedy trial statutes, Faretta rights and its line of cases, or rights to subpoena evidence and present a defense without interference from the bench. The defendant not the judge decides defenses, defense strategy and what evidence is required for the defense.

Judge Pantle in 2006 was moved from her assignment at the 26th & California main felony criminal court building in Cook County to the Daley Center downtown Chancery Division. Her reputation among several pro se litigants is that she has a very poor fund of knowledge concerning procedures related to civil litigation in the Chancery Division of the courts.

This past week Chief Judge Evans has re-assigned Judge Pantle to the 26th & California criminal court building again, but this time as a bond judge for felony cases. I find this an outrage to put a judge that blatantly violated the Illinois Constitution in the past who placed extremely excessive bails on me including an unconstitutional no bail order and then DEFIED and SNUBBED HER NOSE AT an Appellate Court ORDER and raised my bail again illegally from a $1000 personal recognizance bail to an extremely excessive and vindictive $500,000 D-Bond (requiring 10% payment for release). Judge Timothy Evans apparently, along with Presiding Criminal Court Judge Biebel apparently feel that a judge without the necessary demeanor and control of her irrationality and vindictiveness should be the one judge assigned to set bonds on the most serious felony cases in Cook County. The community should work hard to remove this dangerous, outrageous, vindictive, arrogant, and irrational judge from the bench for good!

Written by Linda Shelton

December 5, 2008 at 4:54 pm

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