Cook County Judges

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U.S. Supreme Court refuses to uphold its own holdings and due process

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The U.S. Supreme Court refused to uphold their own holdings in denial of Shelton’s Petition for Writ of Mandamus. Dr. Linda Shelton was unlawfully convicted of  contempt of court and summarily sentenced to 16 months in jail with no trial or due process because she followed Illinois law that allows a person other than the defendant to file a next-friend petition for writ of habeas corpus on “behalf of another”. Judge McHale held that it was illegal for Shelton to file this petition on behalf of Annabel Melongo when Shelton was not an attorney.  Melongo was released after 20 months when the Illinois eavesdropping law was declared unconstitutional. Melongo had been denied hearing on Shelton’s petition for her in an illegal act by Cook County judges who refused to hear this petition. Thus they violated the U.S. Constitution Suspension Clause that says that habeas may not be suspended except in times of war.  READ THE FOLLOWING!! (Transcript where Shelton appeared before Judge McHale asking for him to assign judge to represent Melongo on Shelton’s next-friend petition for writ of habeas corpus on her behalf on May 11, 2010 – NOTE: habeas corpus is the highest right a person has in the U.S. written in the constitution to protect against unlawful incarceration yet few Americans are educated to know what this means!)

Shelton alleges Judge McHale (substituting for Judge Biebel – presiding judge of the Cook County Criminal Court) illegally and in an act of felony federal treason and conspiracy to violate rights under color of law, after stating he would not hear her petition (i.e. admitted she was before him on an administrative matter and not with him acting as a judge) in retaliation for Shelton’s whistle blowing about judicial corruption in the Circuit Court of Cook County (she had given the FBI and U.S. Attorney extensive evidence about this corruption and published it on Internet blogs), in May through November, 2010, summarily convicted her of three (3) “cases” which should have been three (3) “counts” of criminal contempt for the legal act of filing a next-friend habeas petition ,as a NON-ATTORNEY, on behalf of Annabelle Melongo, a dual Haitian/Cameroonian citizen with language difficulties and who was confusing English and Roman law, and then telling the judge that his act of ruling that a non-attorney filing was “illegal” was a violation of his oath of office to follow the law as well as a criminal act. The conviction was not only illegal, but it was retaliatory.

The fact that he stated he would not hear the petition meant that there was no case before him when he charged me with contempt and this occurred after I asked for SOJ as a right, which also means that his orders are void as he did not follow the law on SOJ.

Shelton alleges Judge McHale’s consecutive SUMMARY sentences of 4, 6, and 6 months (total of 16 months) in CCDOC with good time jail credits quashed by order of Judge McHale, were in:

A) violation of IL Substitution of Judge (“SOJ”) as Right Statutes, 735 ILCS 5/2-1001 which make all orders given after denial of this SOJ as a right void, Jiffy Lube International, Inc. v. Agarwal,2 77 Ill.App.3d 722,727, 214 Ill.Dec. 609,661 N.E.2d 463 (1996); Curtis v. Lofy, 394 Ill. App..3d 170, 176 (2009);

B) violation of Habeas Statutes, 735 ILCS Art X which allow a person to file a habeas petition on “behalf of another”;

C) violation of IL Appellate Court holding that requires a full due process jury trial if contempt sentence is summarily imposed on a day other than the day in which the contemptuous act occurred In re Marriage of Betts, 200l ll.App.3d 26 (1990); Winning Moves, Inc., v. Hi! Baby, Inc., 238 Ill. App.3d 834 (1992); Kaeding v. Collins, 28I Ill.App3d 919 (1996)

D) violation of IL sentencing statutes requiring concurrent sentences for the same conduct or acts occurring during the same state of mind, 720 ILCS 5/3-3; and

E) violation of IL statute where habeas petition must be heard quickly before the chief judge of the division, Habeas statutes, 735 ILCS 5/10-119, and the rules of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Rule 15.2(d); and

F) violation of the U.S. Supreme Court holdings and IL Court holdings which:

1) require jury trial if sentences exceed 6 months aggregate for contempt, In re Marriage of Betts, 200 lll.App.3d 26 (1990), Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966); Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 513, 94 S.Ct. at 2692 (1974); Taylor v. Hayes, supra, 418 U.S. at 495, 94 S.Ct. at 2701;

2) forbid sentencing for more than one count of contempt during one trial or case, People v. Brown, 235 Ill.App.3d 945 (1992);

3) forbid removal of automatic statutory good time jail credits by a judge  – Good Time Jail Allowance statute, 730 ILCS 130, gives jurisdiction for such credits to the county sheriff and not the judge, also violation of Codispoti v. Pennsylvannia 418 U.S. 506 (1974); and

4) specifically state it is legal for a non-attorney to file a next-friend petition for writ of habeas corpus, U.S. ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 76 S.Ct 1 (1955) and Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 128 S.Ct 2229 (2008); 735 ILCS Article X.

The Illinois Appellate Court in violation of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 298 and Smith v. Bennett and Marshall v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 81  S.Ct. 895 (1961) denied my indigence petition , thus denied my appeal illegally.

The Federal District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed Shelton s Federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus regarding these three convictions, ACC 100083-01, 93-01, & 94-01, falsely stating that Shelton did not exhaust state remedies. Judge Hart ignored and violated the U.S. Supreme Court’s rulings in the line of cases Neirsheimer, Regan, and Loftus. People v. Loftus, 400 Ill. 432, 81 N.E.2d 495 (1948), (in response to order of Court in Loftus v. People of State of Illinois, 334 U.S. 804, 68 S.Ct 1212 (1948)); Woods v. Neirsheimer, 328 U.S. 211, 66 S.Ct. 996 (1946); White v. Ragen and Lutz v. Same, 324 U.S. 760, 65 S.Ct. 978 (1945); Young v. Ragen, 337 U.S. 235, 69 S.Ct. 1073 (1949).

There may be an exception to the exhaustion bar for cases involving colorable claims of actual innocence. See, e.g., House v. Bell, 47 U.S. 518, 522 (2006). This case also involves this is as since there is no possibility that filing a next-friend habeas petition is illegal or that complaining, as a litigant to a judge that he is violating the law, when he is violating the law, is illegal, there is no possibility that Shelton is actually guilty of contempt.

These sentences by Judge McHale were acts of felony treason, a violation of 18 U.S.C. §2381, punishable by a sentence of 20 yrs. to life, per previous holdings and/or dicta of the United States Supreme Court including:

1) that the judges in U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980) affirmed the statement of Chief Justice Marshall in Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 5 L.Ed 257 (1821) that it is “treason on the constitution” when a judge “usurps [the jurisdiction] that which is not given”; and

2) that it is a “war on the constitution” when a judge violates his oath of office to support it [including supporting statutes of a state = due process], Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 78 S.Ct. 1401(1958).

Judge McHale’s knowing violation of the statutes concerning petitions for writ of habeas corpus, SOJ as a right, good conduct jail credits; concurrent sentencing for the same act; violation of case law concerning right to trial if sentence is > 6 mo, right to trial if sentence for contempt is given out on day other than day of contempt incidence, ban on more than one count of contempt during one case or trial; and violation of U.S. Supreme Court holdings/dicta in U.S. ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 76 S.Ct 1 (1955) and Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 128 S.Ct 2229 (2008) that a non-attorney may file a next-friend habeas petition prove Judge McHale illegally found Linda Shelton in contempt three times, illegally sentenced her, and knowingly did this in an act of treason, violating Shelton’s constitutional rights to be free of arrest and imprisonment without due process and in violation of law, denied her father’s need for her caretaker, companion, and executive assistant services and love in his final days in an act of cruelty and lawlessness, and denied Shelton’s need for medical care and proper diet.

In addition, Annabelle Melongo’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, filed by Shelton, has been ignored by Judges McHale, (Brosnahan, Wadas, Kazmierski – to whom Plaintiff presented habeas filing prior to presenting it to Judge McHale and all of whom refused to hear it stating that they have no jurisdiction to hear filings from a non-attorney on behalf of another, despite Plaintiff reading the IL habeas statute to them), and Judge Biebel and she is still in jail a year later! All these judges have therefore committed treason. This is a grotesque and extremely serious violation of the Constitution of the United States – suspension clause (Article I, section 9) which states that the Great Writ of Habeas Corpus may not be suspended except in time of war.

Judge McHale was fully informed in open court by Plaintiff of the case law, code, and constitutional issues stated herein and therefore cannot claim mistake or unintentional error. Plaintiff therefore now petitions the U.S. Attorney and U.S. Justice Department to pursue the violations of 18 U.S.C §241 AND 18 U.S.C §242, as well as 18 U.S.C. §2381 that are clearly documented in this document and attachments, under the jurisdiction as permitted by the Presentment Clause of the Constitution and under 18 U.S.C. §3332 – which specifically states, as is supported by case law, that a citizen with evidence of federal crimes may petition a judge to present this evidence to a special grand jury . I ask that the Justice Department bring this cause before a judge for an indictment against Judge McHale for corruption.

Judge McHale ILLEGALLY AND UNCONSTITUTIONALLY IN VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER COLOR OF LAW incarcerated Shelton for 16 month summary sentence for which she served six months and during that time DISCRIMINATED AGAINST DR. SHELTON’S DYING FATHER, ALLAN LORINCZ, BY ILLEGALLY JAILING SHELTON, SNUBBING HER REQUEST FOR HOUSE ARREST TO CARE FOR HER FATHER, AND PREVENTING HER FROM CARING FOR HIM IN HIS LAST DAYS AS HE REQUESTED RESULTING IN HIS DEATH from self-starvation and dehydration due to depression over his loss of his caretaker and companion, Shelton and his progressing Parkinson’s disease.  By turning a deaf ear, HE DISCRIMINATED AGAINST DISABLED SHELTON IN IGNORING HER DISABILITY NEEDS WHILE UNLAWFULLY JAILED BY HIM, in that he refused to order the Sheriff to provide her appropriate medications and food for her conditions. He, IN RETALIATION FOR HER WHISTLE BLOWING AND COMPLAINTS AGAINST JUDGES AND SHERIFF STAFF, ILLEGALLY JAILED HER knowingly and willingly suspended her right to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, violated at least four U.S. Supreme Court holdings by unlawfully convicting her of contempt and summarily sentencing her to 16 mo. in jail, and trashed Shelton’s due process constitutional rights, as well as numerous Illinois statutes and Supreme Court and Cook County Court rules. Finally, he ordered a fitness exam when there was no reason to, in order to help justify his illegal conduct but ignored Shelton’s attorney’s motion that a person cannot be found in contempt if the judge questions their fitness as contempt requires intent and allegation of lack of fitness precludes concept of intent.

 

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See the following criminal cases, appeals, motions for habeas & mandamus – which are explained in the following:

Cook County Court Habeas Petition: 09 CH 12736 – renumbered after transfer from Chancery division to criminal division to 09MR00025 (Shelton’s next friend habeas petition for Maisha Hamilton – allowed and Hamilton assigned a pro bono attorney); 10 HC 0006 & 7 (Shelton’s next-friend habeas petitions for Melongo – Judge McHale refused to hear, told Shelton filing it was criminal); 10 HC 00008 & 12 (Shelton habeas petition – Judge Porter summarily denied)

Cook County Criminal Contempt Cases: ACC 1000083-01, ACC 1000093-01, ACC 1000094-01 (Unconstitutional & Illegal against Shelton – summary total sentence of 16 months for filing next-friend habeas petitions for Melongo and defending her right to do so)

Cook County Criminal Cases: 10CR8092 (Melongo’s criminal eavesdropping case – declared unconstitutional eavesdropping law – this was upheld by IL Supreme Court) 08CR1050201 (Melongo’s computer tampering case which she later won as State committed fraud)

U.S. Supreme Court Complaint for Leave to File Mandamus: 12-6561 (Shelton pro se filing, granted in forma pauperis but denied leave to file brief)

Illinois Appellate Court: 10-3342, 10-3344, 10-3345 (Shelton’s appeal of contempt cases dismissed when denied in forma pauperis and demanded back payment for previous cases as well as $25 payment for each of these cases)

_______________________________________

NOTE: the following case law

CONTEMPT

Sacher et al. v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 72 S.Ct. 451, 96 L.Ed. 717 (1950)

Courage does not equal contempt.

An attorney has the right to make a fearless, vigorous argument

It is the right of counsel for every litigant to press his claim, even if it appears farfetched and untenable to obtain the trial court’s considered ruling. Full enjoyment of that right, wit due allowance for the heat of controversy, will be protected by appellate courts when infringed by trial courts. At 9

Men who make their way to the bench sometimes exhibit vanity, irascibility, narrowness, arrogance, and other weaknesses [ignorance] to which human flesh is heir. Most judges, however, recognize and respect courageous, forthright lawyerly conduct. They rarely mistake overzeal or heated words of a man fired with a desire to win, for the contemptuous conduct which defies rulings and deserves punishment. They recognize that our profession necessarily is a contentious one and they respect the lawyer who makes a strenuous effort for his client. At 12

Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, Footnote 4, 88 S.Ct. 1477, 20 .Ed.2d 522 (1968)

The court has long recognized the potential for abuse in exercising the summary power to imprison for contempt—it is an ‘arbitrary’ power which is ‘liable to abuse.’ Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 313, 9 S.Ct. 77, 82, 32 L.Ed. 405 (1888). ‘(I)ts exercise is a delicate one, and care is needed to avoid arbitrary or oppressive conclusions.’ Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 539, 45 S.Ct. 390, 396, 69 L.Ed. 767 (1925).4

Footnote 4. ‘That contempt power over counsel, summary or otherwise, is capable of abuse is certain. Men who make their way to the bench sometimes exhibit vanity, irascibility, narrowness, arrogance, and other weaknesses to which human flesh is heir.’ Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 12, 72 S.Ct. 451, 456, 96 L.Ed. 717 (1952). See also Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U.S. 378, 39 S.Ct. 337, 63 L.Ed. 656 (1919); Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 61 S.Ct. 810, 85 L.Ed. 1172 (1941); Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S. 399, 76 S.Ct. 456, 100 L.Ed. 474 (1956).

United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1972).

[T]he conduct so personally involved the trial judge that the contempt hearing should be presented before another judge. “Attorneys have a right to be persistent, vociferous, contentious, and imposing, even to the point of appearing obnoxious, when acting in their client’s behalf.” In the matter of Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389, 400 (7th Circ. 1972)

Sentences more than six months either separate or aggregate require a jury trial:

When the aggregate punishments for a particular course of criminally contemptuous conduct committed in the presence of a judge exceed the parameters of punishments normally imposed for misdemeanors and the punishments are not imposed immediately after occurrence of the contemptuous conduct, the contemnor is entitled to a jury trial as to the contempt charges. The traditional test for determining whether or not a charged offense is a misdemeanor is whether the penalties exceed $500 or six months imprisonment. Where, as with criminal contempt in Illinois, no maximum punishment is prescribed for an offense, courts look to the penalty actually imposed to determine whether an offense is so serious that a jury trial was required. Some decisions suggest that in the context of contempt proceedings, the $500 fine component.., is subject to upward adjustment based on the contemnor’s financial resources and inflationary trends. In re Marriage of Betts,  200 Ill. App. 3d 26, 50, 558 N.E.2d 404 (4th Dist. 1990).

The following are holdings in Maita v. Whitmore, 508 F.2d 143 (9th Cir. 1975):

[Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 94 S.Ct. 2697, 41 L.Ed.2d 897, and Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 94 S.Ct. 2687, 41 L.Ed.2d 912.]

First: The rules as to whether an ordinary criminal offense is ‘petty,’ thus not requiring a jury trial, or ‘serious,’ thus requiring a jury trial, also apply to charges of criminal contempt. Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, supra, 418 U.S. at 513, 94 S.Ct. at 2692; Taylor v. Hayes, supra, 418 U.S. at 495, 94 S.Ct. at 2701.

Second: ‘Crimes carrying more than six month sentences are serious crimes and those carrying less are petty crimes.’ (Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, supra, 418 U.S. at 512, 94 S.Ct. at 2691; Taylor v. Hayes, supra, 418 U.S. at 495, 94 S.Ct. at 2701.

Third: ‘Judgment about the seriousness of the crime is normally heavily influenced by the penalty authorized by the legislature.’ Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, supra, 418 U.S. at 511, 94 S.Ct. at 2691. Indeed, if the penalty authorized by the legislature exceeds six months, there is a right to a jury trial, even though the judge could impose a sentence of six months or less. Baldwin v. New York, 1970, 399 U.S. 66, 68-69, 90 S.Ct. 1886, 26 L.Ed.2d 437, and cases there cited.

Fourth: Where the legislature has not prescribed a penalty, as is often the case when the charge is criminal contempt, the actual sentence imposed determines whether the offense is ‘serious’ or ‘petty.’ Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, supra, 418 U.S. 512, 94 S.Ct. 2687 at 2691; Taylor v. Hayes, supra, 418 U.S. at 495, 94 S.Ct. at 2701. In such a case, when multiple contempts are tried together, the imposition of consecutive sentences aggregating more than six months makes the offenses ‘serious’ and requires a jury trial. Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, supra, 418 U.S. at 516-518, 94 S.Ct. at 2693-2694. On the other hand, where there are convictions for several contempts but the aggregate sentence does not exceed six months because the sentences are concurrent, jury trial is not required. Taylor v. Hayes, supra, 418 U.S. at 496, 94 S.Ct. at 2702. Moreover, it makes no difference that the trial judge at first imposes consecutive sentences totalling more than six months, if he afterward reduces them to six month sentences to be served concurrently; jury trial is not required. Id. at 496, 94 S.Ct. at 2702.

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  1. It’s more than the judges it’s the clerk’s as well. I know a clerk who is having sexual relations with the felons on her docket. Giving them confidential information about cases, and using her power to unjustly incarcerate others. The cook county court system has for years been controlled by criminals. and this is why. The people of cook county elects criminal judges, who hires criminal clerks, and bailiffs. And there mission is to keep the lower class in a state of destitute. it’s a shame.

    Like

    Dominque Lucas

    August 2, 2015 at 12:05 pm


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