Petition to U.S. Supreme Court for
Writ of Mandamus

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Case No. 12-6561

In re DR. LINDA LORINCZ SHELTON, *Petitioner*

DR. LINDA LORINCZ SHELTON,
Defendant - Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CLERK,
ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT,
ILLINOIS APPELLATE COURT FIRST DISTRICT,
CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY
AND JUDGE MICHAEL MCHALE,
Plaintiff - Respondent.

MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE CONSIDERATION OF REMEDY FOR SYSTEMIC LAWLESSNESS OF CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY JUDGES, REQUESTING APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL MASTER REGARDING CASES 11-10814, 11-10790, AND 12-6561

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Please note that there are no separate sections to this document.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Please note that there are no new authorities that all authorities are contained in previous submissions of several Petitions for Certiorari and Mandamus referenced and incorporated in this document.

MOTION

NOW COMES Linda Shelton with agreement by joinder of David Bambic (see attached affidavit Exh A), both pro se who respectfully move this Honorable Court to consolidate consideration of remedy for systemic lawlessness of Circuit Court of Cook County ("CCCC") Judges, by requesting appointment of special master, as requested in 12-6561, to investigate the CCCC and their lawlessness, starting with cases 11-10814, 11-10790, and 12-6561, and in support of this motion states as follows:

Note this motion is filed concurrently with motion for rehearing of cases 11-10814 and 11-10790.

Each of these cases, as well as three other cases in preparation which will be partially described herein, contain unequivocal evidence (in appendices) of systemic and pervasive lawlessness, condoned by higher Illinois courts, as a pattern and practice by the judges of the CCCC in the criminal, domestic, probate, and misdemeanor divisions to such an extreme degree that Petitioners request that the supervisory authority of this Hon. Court be instituted.

In cases already filed with this Hon. Court we will not repeat evidence and authorities contained therein already in this Court's possession, but will refer to it as if incorporated herein in its entirety.

In 11-10814 the Presiding Judge (Chief) of the First Municipal Division and the Chief Judge of the CCCC are both aware that the Clerk has **no procedure to file or schedule for hearing ANY petition for writ of habeas corpus**

regarding any misdemeanor case. (See affidavit of Attorney Albukerk - 2-\A23\- Appendix B8-9 to [first] supplement to petition for writ of mandamus, 11-10814). This is a gross and systemic constitutional violation. In addition both judges are fully aware that Judge Chiampas has **REFUSED to honor higher court precedent requiring dismissal of a case when the criminal complaint is legally insufficient** (including refusing to follow the procedure defined by this Hon. Court and higher court precedent regarding what is legally insufficient - see Exhibit B = Response to Motion for Proof of Other Bad Acts filed August 24, 2012 especially pp 8-10 [details why charges in this case and all pending cases legally insufficient & don't state a charge])– as well as **stated in open court that federal law does not apply in her courtroom** (see Appendix to Third Supplement H p 17-41) ignoring federal speedy trial law or Illinois higher court speedy trial precedent (Third Supplement Appendix H 35-41 & G, J, K & M), as well as has refused to enforce compulsory process (See third Supplement). Therefore, Petitioner is scheduled for trial on November 26, 2012 after state and federal speedy trial rights have been violated with legally insufficient complaints and without witnesses that are exculpatory. There is no question that she is going to be railroaded. As said in 12-6561 this likely is in retaliation for Shelton's web sites exposing this judicial corruption in Shelton's, Bambic's and many other cases: http://cookcountyjudges.wordpress.com and exposing corruption of the Illinois Attorney General and Cook County Sheriff's police: http://illinoiscorruption.blogspot.com and

http://cookcountysheriffdeputies.wordpress.com. While in jail, an officer (with personal relationships to a judge, actually told Shelton that "Judge Riley is going to screw you."

In case 11-10790, David Bambic **lost custody of his daughters** to his drug-addicted ex-spouse, who obtains narcotics by stealing them from a neighbor [or patients](Appendix to 11-10790 S 56 = neighbor's affidavit) **based solely on unverified hearsay** from the ex-spouse who is a drug-addiction counselor, in an ex parte sham "trial," that Bambic is verbally abusive and the ex-spouse's non-expert "opinion"(non-admissible evidence) that Bambic needs anger management classes and is dangerous because he is an ex-Marine [are all our returning soldiers not going to lose custody of their children?], **despite the fact that this issue was investigated by state child welfare agency and these allegations were determined to be UNFOUNDED** (Appendix to 11-10790 S p19 & 43), as well as the fact that Bambic worked at a high security government facility and had high security clearance with yearly drug and mental health tests proving he is not dangerous in any way, as well as a psychologist's report that he has no mental health issues except extreme sadness due to separation from his beloved daughters (Common Law Record to 11-10790, C V1 p179-182) who pre-divorce he had taken shopping daily, cooked for daily, and attended all their school events.

The **judge refused to enforce state statutes that require** the child representative to provide **discovery pretrial in the form of a statutorily**

required "pretrial memorandum." (750 ILCS 5/506) Therefore, with a Sixth Amendment discovery violation the trial and custody decision was blatantly void.

Also the judge granted an order of protection **solely based on this unverified hearsay,** as well as in violation of statutes – because the judge failed to acknowledge that the interim orders of protection expired 11 times while the case was pending making the complaint for order of protection having been expired on its face 11 times. (See 11-10790 p 2-4) Therefore, the judge was without jurisdiction to enter an order of protection, yet he used this void OOP to deny Bambic custody of his daughter and equal parenting, as well as to limit his visits to only supervised and then less than 13 hrs. one year and no hours the next year (see petition 11-10790).

In addition, **the judge, without any due process evidentiary hearing**, while throughout proceedings **refusing to allow a court reporter for indigent father** [in Cook County in civil cases, the court refuses to provide a court reporter] (indigent due to at the time recent injury at work), **and refused his statutory duty to examine and approve a bystander's report** (See petition 11-10790). This **led the Illinois Appellate Court First District to affirm the Trial Court's decision without examining any of the issues because they stated it was Bambic's fault for not preserving and presenting the record of proceedings** (See record on appeal).

Bambic presented **several affidavits from other now non-custodial parents** from this and other judges in the family court system in Illinois that

experienced the same systemic and pervasive lack of due process, and has a dozen more willing to testify. The bottom line is that the entire basis for Judge Haracz' order removing custody from Bambic and severely limiting his visits is fantasy based on no credible evidence whatsoever and against the manifest weight of the little evidence Bambic was able to present pre-trial and post-trial.

In this case, 12-6561, five senior judges have continued over the past two years to refuse to hear two next-friend petitions for habeas corpus in two felony cases. In addition, Judge McHale, the acting presiding judge during the frequent unexplained absences of Judge Biebel, the presiding judge of the criminal division and/or four other judges have violated statutes concerning filing next-friend habeas petition, sue sponte overturning the statute and stating it is illegal for a non-attorney to file such a petition; violating substitution of judge statutes by refusing to transfer the motions to another judge; has violated numerous statutes and U.S. Supreme Court holdings requiring a trial if the sentence for a criminal contempt conviction is greater than 6 months (here 16 months), if the sentence for contempt is issued on a day other than the day of contempt, as well as denied good time jail credits without statutory authority, and in addition the Trial Court ordered that the three counts of wrongfully alleged contempt were three cases of contempt and ordered consecutive sentences in violation of statutes.

In a case in preparation in the probate division concerning Shelton, the probate judge has also denied due process by most significantly ignoring

trial testimony from several years ago (proving fraud upon the court now) where the alleged trustee of Shelton's deceased father's trust[1], Alice Dale, as well as Shelton's now deceased father, Dr. Allan Lorincz, testified under oath and subject to cross-examination that Shelton had moved in with Lorincz in 2006 to care for him, that Dale was mentally ill and needed Shelton's help to care for her father, that Dale lived in New Jersey and could not care for her father, that Dale even appreciated the help that her family received from Shelton with her own mental health and financial issues, that Shelton was loving and skilled at caring for Lorincz and he appreciated it. **Instead Judge Riley quoted false statements from Dale's alleged "trust attorney"** who stated to the judge that he had evidence that Shelton did not live with her father, that Shelton exploited her father, that Shelton threw things at her father, and that Shelton did not show any caring or loving behavior to her father and therefore was not entitled to a statutory custodial lien. Furthermore, these **attorneys lied to Judge Riley that Shelton's attorney did not provide discovery**, yet Shelton's attorney Held testified that he did provide discovery as well as four supplements to answers to interrogatories. **Judge Riley dismissed Shelton's claims and trust challenge based solely on this falsely alleged discovery violation in itself a violation of higher court precedent**, which does not allow such extreme dismissal of a case even IF there

[1] Shelton is the rightful trustee, as Alice Dale a mentally ill person under the influence of a corrupt attorney coerced Dale into believing that Shelton's now deceased father, Dr. Allan Lorincz had removed Shelton as the trustee of his trust and replaced her with Dale as the trustee. The documents given to the court prove that Lorincz's signature did not appear in both place3s required to sign to activate the amended trust and the one place where he did sign it was clearly forged.

was a discovery violation. This fraud upon the court has been reported by both Shelton and Mr. Held (Shelton's attorney) to the **Illinois Attorney Regulatory and Disciplinary Commission who for months have done nothing**, as well as Shelton has reported this judicial misconduct to the Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board who also after months has still done nothing.

Immediate irreversible harm is befalling Shelton, yet the Illinois Appellate Court has denied a stay of court orders [allowing distribution of estate assets and eviction of Shelton during appeal], because Judge Riley has sanctioned her for falsely alleging she filed frivolous claims by turning her entire inheritance, which was supposed to go into a special needs trust (as Shelton is disabled and progressively getting worse) instead giving it as a sanction to the corrupt estate attorneys who manipulated her mentally ill sister in the amount of >$300,000, while never providing to Shelton a due process evidentiary hearing on her claim or her trust challenge (despite the fact that Shelton read in open court Dale's and the deceased court testimony from the transcript described above.

In addition, **Judge Riley is allowing these corrupt attorneys to begin eviction proceedings to throw disabled Shelton out on the street** claiming that the home where she lives belongs to the estate and they want to sell it to pay the attorney fees. Lorincz had bought a home for Shelton's brother, paid >$200,000 towards Dale's home in New Jersey and promised the home in which he lived to Shelton after his death. Shelton had shared this home with her father for four years until his death and during the past two years lived in it alone, with the help of

friends who drop by as assistants due to her disabilities, and in which she had helped her father with meals daily for 14 years after her mother died in 1996 and spent time daily with her father for all those years, assisting him in taking care of the house, as well as assisting him at work and home as his secretary, real estate agent and manager, and medical research assistant, in the most loving and attached father-daughter bond thought imaginable.

Also in preparation are several other cases like above, where **extensive exculpatory evidence is suppressed by the judge**, **criminal complaints are grossly legally insufficient, compulsory process denied, fraud by public officials and witnesses is openly condoned, civil cases affirmed by the appellate court for lack of adequate record after the court violated statutes and refused to even review bystander's reports** prepared according to statutes, et., - all outrageous, constitutional and civil rights violations.

In fact, to illustrate the extent of this corruption, Exhibit G is a petition for criminal contempt against the Oak Lawn Police who arrested Shelton recently on warrants that had been withdrawn (after showing the court orders to the police that they had been withdrawn) and yet Judge Chiampas refused to issue the rule for the Oak Lawn Police refusing to adhere to her order and NOT arrest Shelton! **To be arrested on a warrant illegally issued in an act of harassment by a Judge on a case that Shelton won a year prior and on warrants that had been withdrawn** – where the police admit they reviewed the orders withdrawing the warrant – **means that Shelton has absolutely no remedy to this lawlessness**

and obvious judicial bias, and must submit herself to lawlessness including conviction despite legally insufficient complaints, arrest without warrant or probable cause, and confiscation of her property without due process, while endless numbers of parents have de facto lost custody of their children without due process or even a scintilla of credible evidence against them.

Shelton and Bambic, along with their network of hundreds of victims of this illegal abusive court system, now mostly impoverished and therefore unable to access the courts are prepared to present evidence of dozens more cases of lawlessness. To do anything less than appoint a special master in the face of the above violates your oaths of offices.

Both Shelton and Bambic, therefore implore this Hon. Court to take this motion seriously and review these three cases, note the extensive, truly unbelievable extent of the lawlessness, and appoint a special master to investigate and institute a judicial oversight and education program, as well as a commission to review these wrongful decisions.

WHEREFORE, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Hon. Court consolidate consideration of remedy for systemic lawlessness of CCCC judges, and appoint a special master to look into systemic violation of civil rights and habeas rights in CCCCs, in view of the copious and extensive, unequivocal evidence provided to this court regarding cases 11-10814, 11-10790, and 12-6561.

October 25, 20112

Respectfully submitted,

Linda L. Shelton, Pro Se

Joined by,

David F. Bambic

Linda Lorincz Shelton, Ph.D., M.D.
9905 S. Kilbourn Ave.
Oak Lawn, IL 60453
(708) 952-9040
Pro Se Defendant/Petitioner

David F. Bambic
2429 Helmar Lane
Joliet, IL 60431
815 436-9099
Pro Se Plaintiff/Petitioner

STATE OF ILLINOIS)
) Ss
COUNTY OF COOK)

AFFIDAVIT

I, David F. Bambic, affirm and declare that I wish to join the Linda Shelton's motion in 12-6561 to consolidate consideration of remedy for systemic lawlessness of CCCC judges, requesting appointment of special master regarding cases 11-10814, 11-10790, and 12-6561, so that the master can investigate systemic lawlessness in the Cook County Court System, and institute a system of oversight and judicial education as well as consider a commission to review recent cases of lawlessness and recommend course of action.

AFFIRMED and SUBSCRIBED before me this 25th day of October, 2012

David F. Bambic

Notary Public

Official Seal
Carrie A Slaasted
Notary Public State of Illinois
My Commission Expires 06/01/2015

Exh A1

AFFIDAVIT OF J. NICOLAS ALBUKERK

NOW COMES, J. Nicolas Albukerk, after being first duly sworn on oath, states:

1. I, J. Nicolas Albukerk, am an attorney registered in the State of Illinois and have represented Linda Shelton on several of her cases over the last five years.

2. Linda Shelton has approximately six misdemeanor cases pending before Judge Peggy Chiampas in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Branch 46, Court Room 102 at 2600 S. California Ave. Chicago IL one of which I am her counsel and the rest she represents herself pro se.

3. On March 21, 2012 Judge Chiampas summarily sua sponte dismissed all of Linda Shelton's pending motions to dismiss including a meritorious motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds and a motion which sought the discovery of witnesses names without reading or ruling on said motions and on March 26, 2012 set the case over objection on May 29, 2012.

4. Linda Shelton, believing that a fair trial was not possible and that incarceration would exacerbate her medical conditions to an unacceptable degree, did not come to Court on May 29, 2012. Warrants were issued for her arrest.

5. Linda Shelton decided that the filing of a habeas corpus petition upon turning herself into the custody of the Court would fulfill her obligation to obey the Court's Order regarding the warrant. To facilitate the filing of the habeas I agreed to research the procedure for filing a habeas petition in a misdemeanor case. The Circuit Court of Cook County rules 15.2 delineates that a habeas petition should be filed with the "Presiding Judge" presumably in the division where the case in question is pending.

6. On May 30th and May 31st of 2012 I went to Judge Wright's Office on the 13th Floor of the Daley Center and spoke to Star, his clerk and Stacy his Secretary. Judge Wright is the

SCAB EXHA1

Presiding Judge of the Municipal One Division which handles misdemeanor cases. On both the 30th and 31st Stacy told me should would call me back with the procedure for filing a habeas petition in a misdemeanor case. She did not. On June 1, 4, 5 and 6 I called Stacy and asked if there was a procedure for filing a habeas petition with the presiding judge of the municipal division. On all of these days Stacy said she'd call me back with the procedure for filing a habeas petition. Stacy did not call me back. However, today, June 6, 2012, at approximately 2:20 pm I called Stacy again and she confirmed that there is no procedure for hearing a habeas petition in the municipal division.

Under penalties of perjury as provided by law pursuant to Section 1-109 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, the undersigned certifies that the statements set forth in this instrument are true, correct, accurate and complete.

J. Nicolas Albukerk

Subscribed and Sworn to me this
6th day of 2012

"OFFICIAL SEAL"
Nubia Duarte
Notary Public, State of Illinois
My Commission Expires 3/25/2014

Notary Signature: Nubia Duarte

NUBIA DUARTE
Name of Notary

3/25/2014
Commission Expiration

EXH A2
SCA 89

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS
FIRST MUNICIPAL DIVISION, CRIMINAL SECTION

People of the State of Illinois Plaintiff v. Linda Shelton Defendant	)))))	No 09 MC1 09223774 Judge Chiampas Presiding

RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR PROOF OF OTHER BAD ACTS

NOW COMES, Linda Shelton pro se, who responds to state's motion as follows:

A. Significant Case Law

Legal Sufficiency of Complaint

1. **A complaint is legally insufficient if it does not state the elements of the alleged criminal offense.** *United States v. Wabaunsee*, 528 F. 2d 1 (1975) [7th Cir] In this case the charging instrument failed to state that defendant knew that items that were transported across state lines were stolen – charged with transporting stolen items across state lines. There was no need to show the insufficient indictment was prejudicial.

2. The failure to allege an element of the offense sought to be charged is a fundamental defect that renders the charge **void,** and it cannot be amended as in the case of simple formal defects. *People v. Scott*, 285 Ill. App. 3d 95, 99 (1996). While a defendant may request a bill of particulars to supplement a sufficient charge so as to assist him in preparing his defense, **a bill of particulars cannot be used to cure a void charge**. *People v. Meyers*, 158 Ill. 2d 46, 53 (1994).

EXH B 1

3. In Illinois, an indictment [or criminal complaint] must be reasonably certain enough to apprise a defendant of the charges against him, enable him to prepare a defense, and permit a conviction or acquittal to serve as a bar to any subsequent prosecution for the same offense. *People v. Greico*, 255 N.E.2d 897, 898-899 (Ill. 1970) A defendant has a fundamental right to be informed of the "nature and cause" of the charges against him or her. *People v. Meyers*, 158 Ill. 2d 46, 51 (1994). It is well settled that an indictment is invalid if it fails to allege an essential element of the statutory offense or, fails to state "the essential facts constituting the offense charged." *United States v. Debrow*, 346 U.S. 374, 376, 74 S.Ct. 113, 114, 98 L.Ed. 92 (1953); *United States v. Horton*, 676 F.2d 1165, 1169 (7th Cir. 1982); *United States v. Purvis*, 580 F.2d 853, 858 (5th Cir. 1978); reh'g denied, 585 F.2d 520, cert. denied, 440 U.S. 914, 99 S.Ct. 1229, 59 L.Ed.2d 463 (1979); *United States v. London*, 550 F.2d 206, 211 (5th Cir. 1977); *United States v. Willis*, 515 F.2d 798, 799 (7th Cir. 1975).

4. In Illinois this fundamental right is given substance by statute and incorporated into section 111-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/111--3 (West 1998)). 725 ILCS 5/111-3 states: "111-3. Form of charge. (a) A charge shall be in writing and allege the commission of an offense by: . . . . (3) Setting forth the nature and elements of the offense charged;" [emphasis added] See *Meyers*, 158 Ill. 2d at 51; *People v. Davis*, 281 Ill. App. 3d 984, 987 (1996). When the *sufficiency* of a charging instrument is challenged in a pretrial motion, the inquiry upon review is whether the instrument strictly complies with section 111--3. *Davis*, 281 Ill. App. 3d at 987.

5. When the language of a statute which constitutes a charge against the defendant defines the acts prohibited, no further particularity is necessary. *People v. Kamsler*, 214 N.E.2d 562, 566 (Ill. 1966) An indictment is not flawed because the overt act could be

described in greater detail. *City of Chicago v. Powell,* 735 N.E.2d 119, 125 (Ill.App.1st Dist, 2000) CITING *People v. Meyers,* 630 N.E.2d 811 (Ill. 1994). Rather an indictment is sufficient so long that it would enable a defendant to prepare a defense. *Id.*

6. Ordinarily, the requirements of section 111-3 are met when the counts of a complaint follow the statutory language in setting out the nature and elements of an offense. *Davis,* 281 Ill. App. 3d at 987. The relevant inquiry is not whether a charging instrument could have described an offense with more particularity, but whether there is sufficient particularity to allow the defendant to prepare a defense. *Meyers,* 158 Ill. 2d at 54. A charging instrument is a preliminary pleading, and it need not contain more than a cursory statement of the facts. *People v. Smith,* 259 Ill. App. 3d at 497. However, it must state some facts.

7. If the charging instrument meets the minimum requirements of section 111--3(a) but (combined with any discovery the State furnishes) is insufficient to allow the defendant to prepare a defense, he or she can--and should--seek a bill of particulars. *Smith,* 259 Ill. App. 3d at 498; *People v. Intercoastal Realty, Inc.,* 148 Ill. App. 3d 964, 971 (1986). An indictment need not state the exact means used in committing a charged offense if that means is not an integral part of the offense. *Grieco,* 255 N.E.2d 899; SEE *People v. Brogan,* 816 N.E.2d 643, 654 (Ill.App.1st, 2004) (defendant's argument that the indictment failed to apprise him of the details of how the overt act was carried out failed because the argument focused on the nature of the proof rather than the nature of the offense.) However, if the means is an integral part of the offense, the indictment needs to state these means.

8. When the language of a statute does not articulate a specific offense, the indictment must articulate a specific overt act. *People v. Potter,* 125 N.E.2d 510 (Ill. 1995) In *Potter,* the defendant was charged with reckless driving. The indictment specifically stated that the

defendant drove recklessly by speeding. The defendant was therefore not left to question whether the reckless conduct was running a red light, driving at night without his lights on, or one of a myriad of other possibly dangerous driving manners. However, there are numerous cases where the reviewing courts ruled that the indictment did not articulate a specific overt act[1], and therefore, these indictments were fatally defective.

Jurisdiction of Court Lacking in Face of Legally Insufficient Complaint

9. The Court has a continuing obligation to examine jurisdictional issues and make sure that it has jurisdiction in a case. When a complaint or indictment does

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[1] *People v. Foxall*, 283 Ill. App. 3d 724 (1996): The defendant was charged by information with disorderly conduct based on transmitting a false report of sexual misconduct to the Department of Children and Family Services. *Foxall*, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 727. The reviewing court held that the information was insufficient because it did not specify the contents of the false report, and basic fairness required the State to identify the allegedly false statements. *Foxall*, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 727.
Davis: The reviewing court found that the indictment was insufficient when the defendant was charged with official misconduct based on "disseminat[ing] information," but the indictment did not identify the contents of the alleged communication. *Davis*, 281 Ill. App. 3d at 990.
People v. Stoudt, 198 Ill. App. 3d 124 (1990): The reviewing court held that a complaint that charged defendant with resisting a police officer was insufficient when the complaint stated that the officer was engaged in the execution of his official duties but did not identify the authorized act the officer was performing. *Stoudt*, 198 Ill. App. 3d at 128.
People v. Leach, 279 N.E.2d 450 (Ill.App.1st, 1972): The defendant in Leach was charged with resisting or obstructing a police officer. The charging instrument was insufficient because it only stated that the defendant committed the above offense by knowingly obstructing a police officer. *Id.* at 453-454
United States v. Bobo, 344 F.3d 1076 (11th Cir, 2003): The indictment was insufficient because it failed to specify the nature of the scheme used by the defendant to defraud the State of Alabama and the United States.
United States v. Nance, 533 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir., 1976): The indictment was insufficient because it failed to apprise the defendant of the nature of the false pretenses by which the defendant gained unauthorized control over money.
People v. Gerdes, 527 N.E.2d 1310 (Ill.App.5th, 1988): The defendant in *Gerdes* was charged with obstructing justice by giving false information to the police. The charging instrument did not specify the nature of the allegedly false information. The defendant was therefore left to wonder which of many statements to the police the basis for the charge against him was, so the appellate court dismissed the indictment. *Id.*

not state the elements of an offense, the court has no jurisdiction to hold a trial and hear a complaint.

10. The Illinois Supreme Court, in *Brown v. Van Keuren*, 340 Ill. 118, 122 (1930), held that: "The petition required to put the court in motion and give it jurisdiction must be in conformity with the statute granting the right and must show all the facts necessary to authorize it to act, -i.e., it must contain all the statements which the statute says the petition shall state, and if the petition fails to contain all of these essential elements the court is without jurisdiction."

11. Without subject-matter jurisdiction, all of the orders and judgments issued by a judge are void under law, and are of no legal force or effect. *In Interest of M.V.*, 288 Ill.App.3d 300, 681 N.E.2d 532 (1st Dist. 1997) ("Every act of the court beyond that power is void").

Elements of Crime of Disorderly Conduct

12. Disorderly conduct[2] requires that the offender perform some act that disturbs public order. For example, higher court case law defines such acts as follows:

a. Disorderly conduct is conduct that at least has the potential to disturb public order. *People v. Justus*, 57 Ill.App.3d 164, 14 Ill.Dec. 836, 372 N.E.2d 1115 (1978) (defendant not guilty of disorderly conduct when she argued with police officer);

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[2] **ARTICLE 26. DISORDERLY CONDUCT**
720 ILCS 5/26-1 Elements of the Offense.
(a) A person commits disorderly conduct when he knowingly:
(1) Does any act in such unreasonable manner as to alarm or disturb another and to provoke a breach of the peace; . . . .
(b) Sentence. A violation of subsection (a)(1) of this Section is a Class C misdemeanor.

b. There must be some relationship between the accused's conduct and the public order, or between the conduct and the right of others not to be harmed or molested. *People v. Slaton*, 24 Ill.App.3d 1062, 322 N.E.2d 553 (1974).

c. Yelling at a police officer is not sufficient disturbance to warrant a charge of disorderly conduct.

Elements of Crime of Trespass

13. The crime of Trespass to Real Property[3] requires that an offender:

(1) knowingly and without lawful authority enters or remains within or on a building; or

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[3] **TRESPASS STATUTES** [emphasis added by writer]

720 ILCS 5/2-3
Sec. 2-3. "Another".
"Another" means a person or persons as defined in this Code other than the offender.

720 ILCS 5/15-2
Sec. 15-2. Owner.
As used in this Part C, "**owner" means a person**, other than the offender, who **has possession of or any other interest in the property** involved, even though such interest or possession is unlawful, and without whose consent the offender has no authority to exert control over the property.

Included in Part C of 720 ILCS 5/
720 ILCS 5/21-3
Sec. 21-3. **Criminal trespass to real property.**
(a) Except as provided in subsection (a 5), whoever:
(1) knowingly and without lawful authority enters or remains within or on a building; or
(2) enters upon the land of another [defined in 720 ILCS 5/2 3], after receiving, prior to such entry, notice from the owner [defined in 720 ILCS 5/15 2] or occupant that such entry is forbidden; or
(3) remains upon the land of another, after receiving notice from the owner or occupant to depart; or
. . . .
commits a Class B misdemeanor.
For purposes of item (1) of this subsection, this Section shall not apply to being in a building which is open to the public while the building is open to the public during its normal hours of operation; nor shall this Section apply to a person who enters a public building under the reasonable belief that the building is still open to the public.
. . . .
"Land" includes, but is not limited to, land used for crop land . . . .
"Owner" means the person who has the right to possession of the land, including the owner, operator or tenant.

(2) enters upon the land of another [defined in 720 ILCS 5/2 3], after receiving, prior to such entry, notice from the owner [defined in 720 ILCS 5/15 2] or occupant that such entry is forbidden; or

(3) remains upon the land of another, after receiving notice from the owner or occupant to depart; or

. . . .

However, section (1) does not apply to public buildings open during normal business hours. So if a person is told to leave a public building during normal business hours and refuses to leave, without any other criminal accusation, then they cannot be charged with criminal trespass to real property.

14. If a person enters a public building AND interrupts a member of the public's use of the building during public business hours and is told to leave and does not leave, then they can be charged with Criminal Trespass to State Supported Property[4] which has two elements: (1) being told to leave and not leaving the building, and (2) interrupting someone's use of the building and this does not include a police officer or employee of the building (*People v. Duda*, (1980) 82 Ill.App.3d 525, 401 N.E.2d 819, 37 Ill.Dec. 817).

B. Criminal Complaints in this Case and in Complaints of Alleged Other Bad Acts Legally Insufficient

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[4] 720 ILCS 5/21-5

Sec. 21-5. Criminal Trespass to State Supported Land.

(a) Whoever enters upon land supported in whole or in part with State funds, or Federal funds administered or granted through State agencies or any building on such land, after receiving, prior to such entry, notice from the State or its representative that such entry is forbidden, or remains upon such land or in such building after receiving notice from the State or its representative to depart, and who thereby interferes with another person's lawful use or enjoyment of such building or land, commits a Class A misdemeanor.

15. This case and the cases listed that the State wishes to use as examples of "bad acts" are void due to legally insufficient complaints, which means that this Court over three years has failed to examine the complaints to see if they stated a charge and have been acting without jurisdiction on the charges that are legally insufficient and these legally insufficient charges include:

a. 09 MC1 223774 –

(1) charge of trespass to state supported land is facially void as complaint states that SHELTON violated 720 ILCS 5/21- 3(a)(2) [by "knowingly remained upon the land . . . after receiving notice from Assistant Chief William J. Nolan #202 to Depart the Premises."] The complaint is legally insufficient as it **does not state the elements of the crime alleged specifically that Defendant received "notice from the owner or occupant that such entry is forbidden". THE COURT HAS FOR THREE YEARS FAILED TO MAKE A PRELIMINARY DETERMINATION THAT THE CHARGE STATES A LEGALLY SUFFICIENT COMPLAINT, INCLUDING ALL ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED.**

[**NOTE:** This was **not** a charge of trespass to state-supported land which would have required the second element of interrupting someone's use of the building (the complaint would have to state the name of the person interrupted and the exact nature of the interruption. The correct charge might have been 720 ILCS 5/21-3(a)(1) if one considers the complaint that Defendant **failed to leave when told to leave by A/C Nolan** which **does not apply to this situation as "item (1) of this subsection, this Section shall not**

apply to being in a building which is open to the public while the building is open to the public during its normal hours of operation". Section 1 does not apply also as "another" and "Owner" does NOT include the government as there is a different "Trespass to State Supported Land" statute, 720 ILCS 5/21 5, as well as there is impermissible variance (*People v. Oswald*, 69 Ill.App.3d 524, 527-528 (1st Dist., 1979)) regarding charge and acts complained about. You cannot charge someone with entering a building after receiving notice not to enter but try to prove that the person remained upon the land after being told to leave.]

(2) The charge of disorderly conduct is a facially insufficient complaint that does not state any elements of the offense of disorderly conduct. The complaint states that the Defendant "knowingly remained upon the land of the 7th floor . . . Daley Center . . . after receiving notice from Assistant Chief William J. Nolan # 202 to Depart the Premises." This may represent a charge of trespass to real party if it were not a public building, but it does not give any hint how the Defendant allegedly disturbed the public order. Therefore, it is legally insufficient. *Gerdes* (*supra*), *Nance* (*supra*), *Bobo* (*supra*), and *Leach* (*supra*).

(3) The charge of resisting a peace officer[5] [for alleged "kicking" an officer while they were interfering with her medical treatment at a

[5] 720 ILCS 5/31-1

Sec. 31-1. Resisting or obstructing a peace officer, firefighter, or correctional institution employee.

(a) A person who knowingly resists or obstructs the performance by one known to the person to be a peace officer,

hospital after this arrest and Petitioner was suffering from a flashback where the Defendant was not aware of her surroundings related to post-traumatic-stress disorder– a condition which had been initially induced by a battery by police officers while Petitioner was in a wheelchair] is also legally insufficient. The complaint is facially invalid as it states the resisting occurred during an arrest at "Westlake Hospital" and states the Petitioner "kicked" an officer, but the incident/arrest report states that the arrest occurred at the Daley Center in courtroom 704 and not one page or sentence in the report or any discovery document except the criminal complaint mentions any "kicking" by Petitioner. So this is also impermissible variance causing the complaint to be legally insufficient. The discovery provided proves the arrest occurred at the Daley Center but the criminal complaint states that Shelton resisted a peace officer at the Westlake Hospital during an arrest.

As the incident occurred on April 1, 2009, it is too late to file new complaints regarding this incident and the invalid legally insufficient complaint are not sufficient to toll the time period. Therefore, there are **NO legally sufficient complaints that justify this arrest or provide probable cause.**

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firefighter, or correctional institution employee of any authorized act within his official capacity commits a Class A misdemeanor.

b. In case # 06 MC1 221401 – Detention Aide Kimberly Shell #23170 attacked Shelton when she was released and given her possessions. This case never went to trial so the true facts have not been revealed. At the present the allegations are hearsay only. SHELTON's side of the story is that Aide Shell and her accomplices violated the ADA in failing to take Shelton to a hospital to be administered necessary and usual medications for her physical disorders thereby causing pain and suffering. Therefore, when returned her possessions it was necessary to preserve Shelton's health to take her medications. Shelton told Aide Shell that she must immediately take her medication and when Shelton took it out of her returned bag to take her medication, Shell attacked her, grabbing her and causing Shelton to spill her medication on the floor. Shell and her accomplices then committed a brutal assault and battery on Shelton (see attached photographs), which was ignored and covered-up by CPD Internal Affairs. Shelton committed no "bad" or illegal act. Shell committed the act of official misconduct in violating the ADA and failing to accommodate Shelton's medical needs and in addition committed the act of aggravated battery of a handicapped person (Shelton). Shell has never been held accountable for these crimes. The case was dismissed and there has never been a due process hearing on the issues in the case. To state that this is evidence of "other bad acts" is prejudicial and unfair as there has never been any proof of these alleged "bad acts". It is Shell's word against Shelton's word and there has been no trial. If the State is allowed to discuss this case, then Shelton must be allowed to testify about it, call witnesses to prove her side of the story, and show the photographs she has of the beating Shell and her accomplices

committed against Shelton and testify to the fact that Chicago Police Internal Affairs was informed and covered up this official misconduct and false charges.

c. In case # 09 MC1 238219-01, this case has not come to trial, and therefore the Defendant must be considered innocent and the charges false until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Using this case as evidence of "other bad acts" would violate Defendant's constitutional right to be held innocent until proven guilty. It also has charges which are not just acts of perjury by the Sheriff deputies' (complainants) but which are legally insufficient complaints.

(1) The charge of trespass to state supported land 720 ILCS 5/21-5 has two elements: remains upon such land or in such building after receiving notice from the State or its representative to depart, and **who thereby interferes with another person's lawful use or enjoyment of such building or land**, commits a Class A misdemeanor. [emphasis added]

Justus (*Supra*) is on point as Defendant, on May 13, 2009 in the hallway outside courtroom 2005 after the judges were off the bench and headed to lunch was arguing with the Sheriff staff about their duty to protect her and recover property stolen directly in front of their officers, namely Shelton's previously filed tort complaint document that SHELTON lent to the clerk and Judge Maddux while he reviewed SHELTON's Petition to Sue as an Indigent Person and the order issued by Judge Maddux on that Petition , who when asked to stop the theft, refused to do so. She was asking to speak to a supervisor and to make a criminal complaint of theft, while continuing to ask the Sheriff's staff to please help recover

her personal court file on a civil case where she was Plaintiff from the Court Clerk in order to avoid having to make a criminal complaint against the Court Clerk's staff, in the public hallway outside courtroom 2005 in the Daley Center during normal business hours.

The criminal complaint fails to state the second required element of Trespass to State Supported Land – namely that SHELTON interrupted the use of the services in the building by a member of the public – naming the person interrupted and detailing what exactly SHELTON did to interrupt their use of the building. Therefore, the complaint of Trespass to State Supported and is legally insufficient and must be stricken.

(2) The charge of disorderly conduct is legally insufficient and must be stricken as with a charge of calling in a false police report, the charge must state the specific words that the alleged offender used to make the complaint to 911. *Foxall* (*supra*) and *Davis* (*supra*). As the charging document fails to state what words SHELTON used in calling 911, the complaint is legally insufficient. Also as it fails to state the name of the alleged members of the public interrupted and the exact act that constitutes this interruption including the exact words spoken by SHELTON, the charging instrument is legally insufficient and must be stricken.

d. 09 MC1 258392

(1) Again the charge of Trespass to State Supported Land is legally insufficient and must be stricken as it fails to state the second element of the charge, that SHELTON interrupted someone's use of the building and the name of the person as well as how SHELTON interrupted their use of the building. *Davis*

(*supra*), *Duda* (*supra*), *Foxall* (*supra*), *Potter* (*supra*), *Justus* (*supra*), *Slaton* (*supra*).

(2) Again the charge of Disorderly Conduct is legally insufficient as the charge fails to state the exact words that allegedly "alarmed and disturbed Deputy Dodsen". *Gerdes* (*supra*), *Davis* (*supra*), *Duda* (*supra*), *Foxall* (*supra*), *Potter* (*supra*), *Justus* (*supra*), *Slaton* (*supra*).

(3) The charge of Assault is legally insufficient because it fails to state the location at which this incident occurred. 50 W. Washington is a 30 story building holding thousands of offices and hundreds of halls, a lock-up, stores, and many other places like a small city. Failing to state where in the building the incident occurred makes the complaint legally insufficient per *Davis* (*supra*). Charges must be specific and state the elements of the charge.[6] For a disabled, weak woman in custody in a lock-up surrounded by 3 or more large, strong deputies, to state that stating "I'll kick your ass" leaving out the rest of the phrase ["in court as I am with your colleagues who are defending themselves right now in federal court against my civil rights suit"] is quite different than if a healthy person in a public walkway tells someone "I'll kick

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[6] 725 ILCS 5/111-3

Sec. 111-3. Form of charge.

(a) A charge shall be in writing and allege the commission of an offense by:

(1) Stating the name of the offense;

(2) Citing the statutory provision alleged to have been violated;

(3) Setting forth the nature and elements of the offense charged;

(4) Stating the date and county of the offense as definitely as can be done; and

(5) Stating the name of the accused, if known, and if not known, designate the accused by any name or description by which he can be identified with reasonable certainty.

your ass" with a bladed stance! The first charge would be an act of official misconduct by the deputy alleging this charge and would simply be unbelievable and ludicrous. This is the exact situation that occurred with this charge. Therefore, it is legally insufficient.

e. In case # 09 MC1 260540 again the charge of Trespass to State Supported Land is legally insufficient because it fails to state the second element of the charge, namely the name of the member(s) of the public whose use of the building or services was interrupted by SHELTON and specifically what acts by SHELTON disrupted their use of services. Again for three years the Court has been grossly negligent in failing to examine the charge for legal sufficiency. The charge must be stricken as void.

f. In case #09 MC1 261096 the charge is again legally insufficient and must be stricken as void as it fails to state any element of the crime of disorderly conduct, namely how SHELTON disrupted the public, what exact words she used to disrupt the public, and which members of the public were disrupted.

g. In case #11 MC1 241978 the charge of

(1) disorderly conduct is again legally insufficient and must be stricken as void as it fails to state any element of the crime of disorderly conduct, namely how SHELTON disrupted the public, exactly what words she used to disrupt the public, and which members of the public were disrupted.

(2) Trespass to real property is legally insufficient and must be stricken as void as government agents (officers) are not owners or occupants of the property and this charge cannot apply in a public building.

Therefore, the cases that the State has requested to use as evidence of "other bad acts" are void as are the charges in this case and must be stricken. If not, then as these cases have never been tried and SHELTON has a completely different version of each incident, she would have to be allowed to essentially present her defense on each charge before the jury so as not to bias the jury against her. It would be unfair and prejudicial to allow the State to present such hearsay and outright lies without giving SHELTON an opportunity to refute them. It would defy due process to state to the jury that these incidents occurred as a defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty.

Therefore, this case and the other pending cases should be dismissed as void due to legally insufficient complaints and the Court should correct its outrageous refusal over more than three years to examine the complaints for legal sufficiency.

Finally the above argument has been written in six Petitions for Writs of Habeas Corpus that claim that SHELTON is being held on bail without probable cause on legally insufficient complaints. It is unconstitutional, outrageous, judicial misconduct and prosecutorial misconduct to for the presiding Judge Wright to refuse to hear these Petitions for Writs of Habeas Corpus. Therefore, a Petition for Writ of Mandamus 11-10814 is pending before the United States Supreme Court on the above and other issues.

WHEREFORE, Defendant pro se requests that this Court deny the State's motion and immediately strike all the charges described above.

Under penalties as provided by law pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/109-1 I certify that the statements set forth herein are true and correct.

Respectfully submitted,
Linda L. Shelton, Pro Se

Linda Lorincz Shelton, Ph.D., M.D.
9905 S. Kilbourn Ave.
Oak Lawn, IL 60453
(708) 952-9040
Pro Se Defendant







Exh C2.

MERCY

Emergency Department After Care Instructions

Mercy Hospital and Medical Center
2525 South Michigan Avenue
Chicago, Illinois 60616-2477
312.567.2000

A0001175740
SHELTON, LINDA L D&T:N NO
DOB:09/02/1955 SEX:F Adm: 03/04/06
PHYSICIAN,ER
06063-00032
Form No. 03.525-01/04-3

Provisional Diagnosis:

Multiple Contusions

☐ X-Rays were taken of the: _____

☐ Tests/Treatment: _____

Follow up ☐ Next Day ☐ 2-3 Days
☐ Dr. _____
Phone Your MD

☐ Mercy Works On _____
2600 South Michigan
(312) 567-2979

☐ Please call for an appointment.

☐ No work/school until: _____ **For work related injuries please see your physician.

Additional instructions
Return for any worsening symptoms

☑ Physician Signature _____

Please follow the instructions below as indicated for you:

☐ Abdominal Pain	☐ Hypertension
☐ Animal Bites	☐ Moderate Sedation
☐ Asthma	☐ Neck Pain
☐ Back Pain	☐ Nosebleed
☐ Burns	☐ Pelvic Inflammatory Disease
☐ Cast/Splint Care	☐ Peptic/Gastric Ulcer
☐ Chest Pain	☐ Pneumonia
☐ Croup	☐ Sexually Transmitted Disease
☐ Crutches	☐ Sinusitis
☐ Diarrhea/Vomiting in Adults	☐ Sore Throat
☐ Diarrhea/Vomiting in Children	☐ Sprain/Strain
☐ Ear Infection	☐ Upper Respiratory Infection
☐ Fever in Children	☐ Urinary Tract Infection
☐ Flu in Adults	☐ Vaginal Bleeding, Abnormal
☐ Fractured Extremity	☐ Wound/Suture Care
☐ Headache	
☐ Head Injury	

☐ Other _____

☐ You have _____ sutures/staples which must be removed in _____ days. ☐ Tetanus Toxoid

☐ You were prescribed sedatives or pain medications that may make you drowsy. Do not drink alcohol or operate machinery while you are taking these medications.

X-rays/EKGs do not always show injury or disease. Fractures (breaks in the bones) are not always revealed on the initial x-rays, but may be revealed on subsequent x-rays. Your x-ray/EKG has been read on a preliminary basis. Final reading will be made by the radiologist/cardiologist. You will be notified of any additional findings.

The examination and treatment you have received in the Emergency Department has been given on an emergency basis only. (Should your condition worsen or any new symptoms develop, or should you not recover as expected, contact your doctor or the doctor you were given for follow-up care.) If you cannot contact the doctor, return to the Hospital Emergency Department.

Linda Shelton — Signature of Patient or Responsible Person

Signature of Nursing Personnel

3/4/06 — Date

0240 — Time

PATIENT COPY

Exhibit A

Denied without explanation by Judge Chiampas on 8-3-2012 JS

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS
FIRST MUNICIPAL DIVISION, CRIMINAL SECTION

People of the State of Illinois	)	
Plaintiff	)	No 09 MC1 09223774
v.	)	
Linda Shelton	)	
Defendant	)	Judge Chiampas Presiding

PETITION FOR ADJUDICATION OF CRIMINAL CONTEMPT AGAINST OAK LAWN POLICE OFFICER KIRK, HIS UN-NAMED PARTNER, AND 7-3 PM UN-NAMED LOCK-UP OFFICER

NOW COMES, Linda Shelton pro se, who petitions for adjudication of criminal contempt against Oak Lawn Police Officer Kirk, star #321, his un-named partner, and the 7-3 pm un-named lock-up officer on April 3, 2012, and in support of this motion Defendant states as follows:

JUL 23 2012

County of Cook)
) Ss
State of Illinois)

Affidavit

1. On March 21, 2012, Judge Chiampos issued orders that seven (7) inappropriately and illegally issued misdemeanor arrest warrants had been executed and were therefore recalled and no longer valid. (group Exhibit A)

2. On April 2, 2012 Oak Lawn Police officers were dispatched to the residence of Defendant by unknown persons to execute these arrest warrants. Of Note: Judicial notice is given that it is common knowledge that police departments in Cook County do not routinely send out officers to homes to arrest people on misdemeanor warrants. They generally only serve felony

warrants. Misdemeanor warrants are generally only executed when the police encounter a person during routine procedures where they check identity like traffic stops. Officers have told Defendant that they only serve misdemeanor warrants when they are pushed to do so by superiors or "special interests" with clout. Of NOTE: OLP did not serve a valid, though fraudulent felony fugitive warrant against Defendant between August 2008 and February 2009 (it was withdrawn in February 2009 and represented fraudulent accusations and records from a corrupt parole officer following Defendant after release from prison in 2008 on a wrongful conviction for felony battery of an officer [alleged "bumping" him with her wheelchair] – for details proving wrongful conviction see:

http://cookcountysheriffdeputies.wordpress.com/2009/09/05/sheriff-police-investigator-cynthia-sofus-incompetent-investigations-false-arrests/

3. When Officer Kirk appeared at Defendant's door and stated he was executing arrest warrants, she showed him these court orders recalling the warrants (group Exhibit A).

4. Officer Ricks went to his car to check out these papers and then came back to Defendant, said that **he didn't care about these court orders** and arrested Defendant, even refusing to bring these court orders to the police station.

5. Officer Kirk's partner and the lock-up officer in Oak Lawn on April 2, 2012, 7-3 pm shift, also stated that they **didn't care that Defendant said that she gave Officer Ricks these court orders.**

6. The lock-up officer particularly refused to call his supervisor or send another officer to the house to retrieve the court orders.

7. Later in the day after Defendant was turned over to the custody of Chicago Police, she was released, when they determined the arrest warrants were invalid.

8. Therefore, **Officer Rick and his partner as well as the lock-up officer directly violated and knowingly and willingly violated this court's orders in an act of contempt of this court.**

WHEREFORE, Defendant pro se petitions this Court for adjudication of criminal contempt against these officers for knowing and willing direct violation of this court's orders.

Respectfully submitted,
Linda L Shelton
Linda L. Shelton, Pro Se

Linda Lorincz Shelton, Ph.D., M.D.
9905 S. Kilbourn Ave.
Oak Lawn, IL 60453
(708) 952-9040
Pro Se Defendant

SWORN to and SUBSCRIBED before me this 23rd day of July, 2012

Notary Public Notarized only on original

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS
MUNICIPAL DEPARTMENT OR CRIMINAL DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
OR
THE VILLAGE/TOWN/CITY/OF
_____
vs.

LINDA SHELTON
Defendant

[ ] Probation/Conditional Discharge/Supervision Warrant

_____
INDICTMENT/INFORMATION CASE NO.
And/Or
09122377401
MUNICIPAL DEPARTMENT CASE NO.

ORDER

It is hereby ordered:

[ ] That all warrants issued in this cause, prior to the date of this order, are quashed and recalled

AND/OR

[X] That the warrant in this cause has been executed.

It is further ordered:

That all warrants, issued in this cause prior to the date of this order, and in the possession of the police agency to whom they were issued for service, shall be returned to the office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court.

Dated 03/21/2012

Judge _____ Code 1949
PEGGY CHIAMPAS

FOR INTERNAL OFFICE USE ONLY

Order of Recall/Quash/Execute sent to Law Enforcement: CPD-DIST 10

Prepared by: RESTAINO, VICKI
Clerk

Date/Time: 03/21/2012 11:20:58 System: WAPK.CC00.K252.SBI

Audited By: _____
Clerk

Comment:

FILED
MAR 21 2012
DOROTHY BROWN
CLERK OF CIRCUIT COURT

CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY

CCR N702

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS
MUNICIPAL DEPARTMENT OR CRIMINAL DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
OR
THE VILLAGE/TOWN/CITY/OF
_____
vs.

LINDA L SHELTON
Defendant

[I] Probation/Conditional Discharge/Supervision Warrant

_____
INDICTMENT/INFORMATION CASE NO.
And/Or
09123821901
MUNICIPAL DEPARTMENT CASE NO

ORDER

It is hereby ordered:

[ ] That all warrants issued in this cause, prior to the date of this order, are quashed and recalled

AND/OR

[X] That the warrant in this cause has been executed.

It is further ordered:

That all warrants, issued in this cause prior to the date of this order, and in the possession of the police agency to whom they were issued for service, shall be returned to the office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court.

Dated 03/21/2012

FILED
MAR 21 2012
DOROTHY BROWN
CLERK OF CIRCUIT COURT

Judge _____ Code 1949
PEGGY CHIAMPAS

FOR INTERNAL OFFICE USE ONLY

Order of Recall/Quash/Execute sent to Law Enforcement: _____

Prepared by VICKI M RESTAINO
Clerk

Date/Time 03/21/2012 11:03:25 System:WAPK.CC00.K2S2.RESTAV1

Audited by: _____
Clerk

Comment: _____

CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY

CCR N702

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS
MUNICIPAL DEPARTMENT OR CRIMINAL DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
OR
THE VILLAGE/TOWN/CITY/OF
_____
VS

LINDA SHELTON
Defendant

[ ] Probation/Conditional Discharge/Supervision Warrant

_____
INDICTMENT/INFORMATION CASE NO.
And/Or
09126054001
MUNICIPAL DEPARTMENT CASE NO.

ORDER

It is hereby ordered:

[ ] That all warrants issued in this cause, prior to the date of this order, are quashed and recalled

AND/OR

[X] That the warrant in this cause has been executed.

It is further ordered:

That all warrants, issued in this cause prior to the date of this order, and in the possession of the police agency to whom they were issued for service, shall be returned to the office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court.

Dated 03/21/2012

Judge _____ Code 1949
PEGGY CHIAMPAS

FOR INTERNAL OFFICE USE ONLY

FILED
MAR 21 2012
DOROTHY BROWN
CLERK OF CIRCUIT COURT

Order of [illegible] Issued/Executed sent to Law Enforcement _____

Prepared by: MARCIA M. RESTAINO Date/Time: 03/21/2012 11:03:08 System: WAPK.CC00.K252.RESTAV1

Audited By: _____
Clerk

Connect: _____

CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY

CCR N702

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS
MUNICIPAL DEPARTMENT OR CRIMINAL DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
OR
THE VILLAGE/TOWN/CITY/OF

vs.

LINDA L SHELTON
Defendant

[ ] Probation/Conditional Discharge/Supervision Warrant

INDICTMENT/INFORMATION CASE NO.
And/Or
09126109601
MUNICIPAL DEPARTMENT CASE NO

ORDER

It is hereby ordered:

[ ] That all warrants issued in this cause, prior to the date of this order, are quashed and recalled

AND/OR

[X] That the warrant in this cause has been executed.

It is further ordered:

That all warrants, issued in this cause prior to the date of this order, and in the possession of the police agency to whom they were issued for service, shall be returned to the office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court.

Dated 03/21/2012

Judge _____ Code 1949
PEGGY CHIAMPAS

FOR INTERNAL OFFICE USE ONLY

Order of Recall/Quash/Execute sent to Law Enforcement CPD-DIST 10

Prepared by: RESTAINO, VICKI
Clerk

Date/Time 03/21/2012 11:20:01 System:WAPK.CC00.K252.SBI

Audited By:
Clerk

FILED
MAR 21 2012
DOROTHY BROWN
CLERK OF CIRCUIT COURT

Comment:

CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY

CCR N702

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS
MUNICIPAL DEPARTMENT OR CRIMINAL DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
OR
THE VILLAGE/TOWN/CITY/OF
_____
vs.

SHELTON LINDA
Defendant

[X] Probation/Conditional Discharge/Supervision Warrant

INDICTMENT/INFORMATION CASE NO
And/Or
09128618401
MUNICIPAL DEPARTMENT CASE NO

ORDER

It is hereby ordered:

[ ] That all warrants issued in this cause, prior to the date of this order, are quashed and recalled

AND/OR

[X] That the warrant in this cause has been executed.

It is further ordered:

That all warrants, issued in this cause prior to the date of this order, and in the possession of the police agency to whom they were issued for service, shall be returned to the office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court.

Dated 03/21/2012

Judge _____ Code 1949
PEGGY CHIAMPAS

FOR INTERNAL OFFICE USE ONLY

FILED
APR 2 1 2012
DOROTHY BROWN
CLERK OF CIRCUIT COURT

Order of Recall/Quash Sent to Law Enforcement _____

Prepared by VICKI _____ Date/Time 03/21/2012 12:04:00 System WAPK.CC00.K252.RESTAV1

Audited By: _____
clerk

Comment: _____

CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY

CCR 0702

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS
MUNICIPAL DEPARTMENT OR CRIMINAL DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
OR
THE VILLAGE/TOWN/CITY/OF

vs.

LINDA SHELTON
Defendant

[I] Probation/Conditional Discharge/Supervision Warrant

INDICTMENT/INFORMATION CASE NO.
And/Or
11124197801
MUNICIPAL DEPARTMENT CASE NO.

ORDER

It is hereby ordered:

[ ] That all warrants issued in this cause, prior to the date of this order, are quashed and recalled

AND/OR

[X] That the warrant in this cause has been executed.

It is further ordered:

That all warrants, issued in this cause prior to the date of this order, and in the possession of the police agency to whom they were issued for service, shall be returned to the office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court

Dated 03/21/2012

Judge _____ Code 1949
PEGGY CHIAMPAS

FOR INTERNAL OFFICE USE ONLY

Order of Recall/Quash/Execute sent to Law Enforcement: CPD-DIST 01

Prepared by: RESTAINO, VICKI
clerk

Date/Time: 03/21/2012 11:20:32 System: WAPK.CC00.K252.5BI

Audited By:
clerk

Comment:

FILED
MAR 21 2012
DOROTHY BROWN
CLERK OF CIRCUIT COURT

CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY

CCP N787

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS
MUNICIPAL DEPARTMENT OR CRIMINAL DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
OR
THE VILLAGE/TOWN/CITY/OF
_____
vs.

LINDA SHELTON
Defendant

[I] Probation/Conditional Discharge/Supervision Warrant

_____
INDICTMENT/INFORMATION CASE NO.
And/Or
11160008601
MUNICIPAL DEPARTMENT CASE NO

ORDER

It is hereby ordered:

[ ] That all warrants issued in this cause, prior to the date of this order, are quashed and recalled

AND/OR

[X] That the warrant in this cause has been executed.

It is further ordered:

That all warrants, issued in this cause prior to the date of this order, and in the possession of the police agency to whom they were issued for service, shall be returned to the office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court

Dated 03/21/2012

Judge _____ Code 1949
PEGGY CHIAMPAS

.....

FOR INTERNAL OFFICE USE ONLY

Order of Recall/Quash/Execute sent to Law Enforcement: CPD-GENRL

Prepared by: RESTAINO, VICKI
Clerk

Date/Time: 03/21/2012 11:20:20 System WAPK.CC00.K252.5BI

Audited By: _____
Clerk

Comment:

FILED
MAR 21 2012
DOROTHY BROWN
CLERK OF CIRCUIT COURT

C.10.

CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY

CCR N702

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS

People of the State of Illinois Plaintiff v. Linda Shelton Defendant	)	No 09 MC1 09223774 Judge Chiampos Presiding

NOTICE OF SERVICE AND FILING

To: ASA for courtroom 102
2600 S. California
Chicago, IL 60608

On July 23, 2012 at 9:00 a.m. or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, I shall appear before the Judge in courtroom 102, located at 2600 S. California, in Chicago, Illinois, and present attached Defendant's Petition for Adjudication of Criminal Contempt . . . .

I, Linda L. Shelton certify that I will serve this notice and attached Petition by hand delivery 23rd day of July, 2012 and filed it with the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County at 2650 S. California, in the courtroom 102, Chicago Illinois.

Under penalties as provided by law pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/109-1 I certify that the statements set forth herein are true and correct.

Linda L. Shelton

July 23, 2012

Linda Lorincz Shelton, Ph.D., M.D.
9905 S. Kilbourn
Oak Lawn, IL 60453
708 952-9040 or cell 708 952-0040
Defendant Pro Se

OAK LAWN POLICE DEPARTMENT

9446 S. Raymond Avenue • Oak Lawn, Illinois 60453 • Phone (708) 422-8292
www.oaklawn-il.gov

William Villanova
Chief of Police
SPSC 136th

Roger Pawlowski
Division Chief Administrative
SPSC 123rd

Michael Kaufmann
Division Chief Investigations
FBI/NA 212th

Michael Murray
Division Chief Patrol
SPSC 207th

Dr. Linda Shelton
9905 S. Kilbourn Ave
Oak Lawn, IL 60453

May 11, 2012

RE: Case -12-06

Dear Dr. Shelton:

Because of your complaint, the Oak Lawn Police Department investigated possible misconduct by a member of our agency. The Department now maintains a record of your complaint and subsequent investigation.

We share your concern regarding the conduct of our employee, and appreciate your bringing this matter to our attention. However, our investigation revealed insufficient evidence in this matter to bring disciplinary action against the accused employees.

The Oak Lawn Police Department has benefited by having taken a closer look at the performance of our employee. In our continuing effort to better provide service and protection to the public, information gained during this investigation will be helpful in planning, training and updating our procedures.

Should you wish additional information regarding the disposition in this complaint, please contact Division Chief Michael Murray at (708) 499-7095, and I will make an appointment for you to discuss the case.

Sincerely,

Division Chief Michael Murray

10-29-12
Note:
No one held responsible
total cover-up
Dr Linda Shelton
'12

Petition to U.S. Supreme Court for
Writ of Mandamus

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Case No. 12-6561

In re DR. LINDA LORINCZ SHELTON, *Petitioner*

DR. LINDA LORINCZ SHELTON,
Defendant - Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CLERK,
ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT,
ILLINOIS APPELLATE COURT FIRST DISTRICT,
CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY
AND JUDGE MICHAEL MCHALE,
Plaintiff - Respondent.

MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE CONSIDERATION OF REMEDY FOR SYSTEMIC LAWLESSNESS OF CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY JUDGES, REQUESTING APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL MASTER REGARDING CASES 11-10814, 11-10790, AND 12-6561

PROOF OF SERVICE

I Linda L. Shelton, do swear or declare that on this date, October 29, 2012, as required by Supreme Court Rule 29 I have served the enclosed motion to consolidate consideration of remedy for systemic lawlessness of CCCC judges, requesting appointment of special master regarding cases 11-10814, 11-10790, and 12-6561 to each party to the above proceeding or that party's counsel, and on every other person required to be served, by U.S Mail postage prepaid.

C/O (ret.) Hon Judge Bastone
The Hon. Michael McHale, Judge
50 W. Washington, Room 2600
Chicago, IL 60602

The Hon. Timothy Evans
Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County
50 W. Washington, Room 2600
Chicago, IL 60602

Cook County State's Attorney Anita Alvarez
50 West Washington, Room 3rd Floor West Side
Chicago, IL 60602

Chief Justice Illinois Supreme Court
Supreme Court Building
200 E. Capitol
Springfield, IL 62701

Chief Justice Illinois Appellate Court
First District
160 N. LaSalle, 14th Floor
Chicago, IL 60601

Clerk
U.S. Supreme Court
1 First Street, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20543

Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan
100 W. Randolph 11th Floor
Chicago, IL 60601

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on October 29, 2012

Dr Linda L Shelton

Dr. Linda Lorincz Shelton