Shelton needs grass roots public support and lots of people in the courtroom to fight attacks against her by the injustice system. If you want to keep reading her blog posts, come and support her: read this post.
Fitness or mental competency to stand trial is a complicated topic. Legal fitness concerns the legal terms of fitness, sanity or temporary sanity, and may or may not be related to mental illness. It can also be related to physical illness or incapacity. This is an up to date and extensive memorandum of law which can be used, after review with an attorney and after addition of any new case law that may apply in any criminal case. The recent decision in People v. Stahl, by the Illinois Supreme Court in 2014 is included. This applies to Illinois law and U.S. Supreme Court case law.
MEMORANDUM OF LAW – FITNESS EXAMS – for Complete document download it here, which has extensive case law and authorities. List of Topics Covered:
- Due Process Clause Prohibits Conviction & Sentencing of Mentally Unfit Defendants – If Bona Fide Doubt of Fitness Present at Any Time Must Examine for Fitness & Hold Fitness Hearing
- Statutes REQUIRE the Judge Shall Inform the Defendant that He/She has the Right to Refuse to Answer Questions at the Fitness Exam
- Bail may NOT be Revoked or Denied Based on Order to Undergo Fitness Examination
- Mental Illness is Determined by a Physician; Fitness is a Legal Term Determined by a Court
- Determining if there is a Bona Fide Doubt of Fitness REQUIRES a Fact Specific Inquiry
- Definitions of terms “psychotic”, “irrational”, “delusional”, “hallucinating”, and “competent”.
- Defendant has a Right to Request and Examination by a Psychiatrist or Psychologist of His/Her Choice, in Addition to the Requirement that the Judge Review Prior Psychiatric Examinations, in Determining Fitness.
- Even though the Defendant is Sane at the Time of Trial, Lack of Sanity at Time of Offense may Result in Finding of Unfit for Trial when Defendant Unable to Testify about Mental State at Time of Offense & Unable therefore to Assist Counsel in His/Her Defense [General Insanity AKA Fitness or CST and Temporary Insanity are Two Different Issues]
- Once an Examiner’s Report is Received by the Court, it Must hold a Fitness Trial (Hearing) within 45 Days.
- If Found Unfit Must Determine Least Restrictive Environment for Treatment and Further Evaluation
- Edward’s Issues and Miscellaneous Concerns
UPDATE: 3-14-15 Judge Wadas quashed all Shelton’s subpoenas for witnesses concerning Judge Cannon’s misconduct and bias. He then cut off Shelton’s argument for substitution of Judge Cannon for cause (inability to remember discussions with court disability coordinator, violation of bail law, violation of fitness law, violation of due process in pervasive fashion, ignoring higher court precedent, quashing Shelton’s subpoenas for witnesses and discovery of documents needed for defense, etc) and essentially summarily denied Shelton’s Motion for substitution of judge for cause.
Please standup for civil rights and against pervasive violation of due process, habeas, right to compulsory process, etc., and against excessive force, officer’s false statements, violation of Americans with Disabilities act against a person suffering from PTSD and appear at every court hearing and trial for Shelton – next court date March 26, 2015 room 506, 2600 S. California in Chicago, IL.
Dr. Linda Shelton is falsely charged with felony aggravated battery to an officer for “touching an officer’s ear” during a PTSD flashback in the courtroom, purposely triggered by officers, who were violating a court disability coordinator agreement not to trigger flashbacks and to back-off if one occurred; See: https://cookcountyjudges.wordpress.com/?s=court and https://cookcountyjudges.wordpress.com/?s=court
Come to court and witness argument and Judge Wadas’ decision on this motion Feb. 20, 2015, 2600 S California, Chicago, rm 502 at 10 am. Stand-up against judicial incompetence and violation of due process!! Dr. Linda Shelton has filed a motion for substitution of Judge Cannon for cause in her case. This is the initial summary in this motion. For full motion see: M for SOJ for cause 11-22-14 . For exhibits contact Shelton by email at firstname.lastname@example.org to arrange to view them or obtain copies. For information about Shelton’s case read the motion and/or read this blog post here.
- Judge Cannon, continually over two years, except for the ten months of her absence, has conducted this case with such overwhelming and pervasive violation of statutes, violation of due process rights, violation of constitutional rights, and biased as well as irrational statements that she cannot be considered to have the capability to proceed in a fair manner. Her recent statements are so full of falsehood and confabulation that a case can be made that she is not fit to serve on the bench and should be examined by a psychiatrist for mental disability.
- Judge Cannon’s inability to remember discussing ADA accommodations with Court Disability Coordinator (“CDC”) Milissa Pacelli, inability to understand that Elgin Mental Health Center never treated Shelton for a mental disorder and they found her fit, thus J. Cannon’s continued accusations of unfitness and need for psychotropic medications appear to be bias or confabulation, inability to understand that J. Reddick – in her absence – had given Shelton extension of time to subpoena communications between the CDC and Sheriff staff on Oct. 3, 2013 , confused and irrational statements about whether Shelton had any medical records or had ever been in the courtroom , false statements and pervasive violation of statutes and due process rights, and imaginary rulings by a judge who was never assigned and never appeared in this case, could either be knee-jerk confabulation due to early dementia or malicious misconduct. She has been very ill for months and it may be possible that she has not recovered sufficiently to continue as a judge or that she has unfortunately fallen into the depths of early dementia. The failure of the Assistant State’s Attorney and Assistant Public Defenders to step in and question her extreme, pervasive, and continuing statutory, constitutional, and factual errors is inexcusable misconduct.
 See transcript summary and transcript 11/14/14 pp 24-25 & CDC Pacelli Shelton emails 1-1-13 on Exhibit CD  See transcript summary and transcript 11/14/14 p 5 l 1-7, pp 24-25, EMHC Report of 10/31/13; letter from Dr. Galatzer-Levy; Report from Dr. Rappaport p 24 or Bates #1041; EMHC 10-31-13 report p 4 on Exhibit CD  See transcript summary and transcript of 11/14/14 p 3-4, 12 where J Cannon does not appear to understand the reason for and function of court disability assistance Jeff Gertie, and calls J Reddick’s orders a “civil case” ; Transcript 10/3/14 p 78-80 on Exhibit CD  See transcript summary and transcript of 11/14/14 p 20-22 on Exhibit CD  See entire transcript summary and all transcripts on Exhibit CD; See this entire motion. See transcript summary and transcript of 11/14/14 p 6 where J. Cannon states J. Wadas denied Motion for Substitution of Judge In April 2013, but J. Wadas never appeared on this case on Exhibit CD
Click here to download full motion: Motion to declare Illinois battery statute unconstitutional
This motion alleges that the Illinois battery and aggravated battery statutes are unconstitutional because (a) they are discriminatory and therefore violate the Americans with Disabilities Act, (b) they suffer from overbreadth thereby making innocent contact criminal, (c) they are vague and therefore subject to misuse and impossible to determine if an act is innocent or criminal, (d) they deny equal protection as there is no rationality as to how they are applied to protect the public interests concerned, and (e) they deny due process in violating the Proportionate Penalties Clause of our Illinois Constitution (they are cruel, degrading or so wholly disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock the moral sense of the community in alleging the same act and penalty for touching an officer’s ear [or even for touching an officer’s bullet proof vest with a piece of paper] as for beating an officer so bad he is in critical condition, stabbing a citizen numerous times with a knife, or making a bomb which explodes and harms a person). These statutes also violate the separation of powers clause in that they de facto give the judiciary the power to legislate, in that the judges, not the legislature decide what conduct is a crime and what sentence a person committing that conduct should receive, out of a vast array of possible conducts, which are both unintentional and intentional, depending upon whom you believe.
In Illinois state statutes allow those charged with crimes to pay 10% of their bail to be released from jail pre-trial. Note that this is an incentive for the judges to set hugely excessive bails in Illinois.
This means that the bond processing and holding fee, which is a fixed service whether the bond check is for $100 on a $1000 bail or $10,000 on a $100,000 bail is obviously unfair, as the court clerk would retain $10 and $1,000 respectively for the exact same service of processing the bond check. The $1,000 should be considered a $995 overcharge and that hurts especially if you are poor and innocent.
This ties the type of charge and the whim of the judge in setting bail to a fixed service, which can be considered institutionalized fraud by the State of Illinois and the court clerks, as well as considered exploitation of defendants.
This is a scheme by Cook County to take the profits (from loaning you the money) from bail bondsmen who are banned in IL and give the profits (not a loan but a fixed service) from bail to the courts. If the amount the clerk receives for a fixed service of processing the bond is variable (set by statute at 10 % of the bond or 1% of the bail amount if it is a D-Bond; C-Bond requires you pay 100% of bail and is rarely set; personal recognizance bond allows you to pay no bond for release) and tied to the amount of bail, then the judges are encouraged (actually instructed) to set bails in IL 5-10 times higher than in other states so as to maximize the profits for the clerk/courts/county. This is discriminatory and violates the constitutional right to be free of excessive bail amounts.
Remember, it doesn’t matter if you are innocent or guilty as all pay this fee IF they can pay their bond, do not choose to pay the entire bail – which means there is no fee for them – and IF they choose to pay the bond instead of sit in jail for the usually year or years it takes to go to trial.
In other areas of law, tying the fee for a fixed service to an unrelated service is considered fraud. For example: When doctors’ billing agents charge by percentage of doctor’s income to process billing instead of charging a flat fee for each bill processed, the U.S. Attorney files charges against the billing agent of Medicaid and Medicare fraud, as the
federal government when paying a surgeon for a $50,000 operation does considers it fraud to pay the billing agent $2500 for processing one surgeon’s bill (if the biller’s fee is 5% of doctor’s income) when they may only charge $5 on a $100 bill (5% to biller) from a doctor to process one family doctor’s bill. They believe this amounts to a $2,495 overcharge on the biller’s bill processing service for the surgeon (paid for by the government).
I am filing this motion this week in my case. If there is any attorney who wants to consider representing me in this case, please email me at email@example.com.
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS COUNTY DEPARTMENT, CRIMINAL DIVISION
People of the State of Illinois ) Plaintiff ) v. ) No. 12 CR 22504-01 Linda Shelton ) Defendant ) Judge Reddick ) presiding MOTION TO DECLARE THE ILLINOIS BAIL STATUTE BOND RETENTION CLAUSE UNCONSTITUTIONAL NOW COMES, the Defendant, Linda L. Shelton, Pro Se who respectfully moves as above and in support of states as follows: 1. The Illinois Bail Statute, 725 ILCS 5/110, was written, according to the debate in the legislature, to correct the unfairness of the previous bail bondsman system resulting in impoverishment of innocent defendants. It eliminated bail bondsmen and allows the court clerks to retain 1% of bail as a fee for “bail bond costs”, when bond is returned or before bond is used for payment of court costs, fines, or attorney fees. 2. Processing and keeping a bail bond costs the clerk the same amount of time and the county the same amount financially whether it is a $100 bond or a $1,000 bond. The county, of course, makes a much larger interest income with the larger bond. 3. Therefore, there is an incentive for judges to set excessive bonds due to this system. The judges have an appearance of using a bond chart to set bond according to the offense charged. 4. The present pertinent sections of the bond statute are contained in an endnote of this document. 5. The law requires courts to adhere to stare decisis, that is they must respect and follow the holdings of higher courts. In Illinois, decisions of an Appellate Court are binding precedent on all circuit courts of locale. Therefore, until the Supreme Court rules otherwise, an applicable Appellate Court decision must be followed by every circuit court. People v. Carpenter, Garibaldi & Montes-Medina, 228 Ill.2d 250, 888 N.E.2d 105 (2008) (Nos. 103616, 103856 & 103857, 4/17/08) [emphasis added] 6. The law permits the trial courts to consider the constitutionality of statutes pretrial. Under Illinois Supreme Court precedent, the Appellate Court is required to resolve unconstitutional issues and constitutional issues which do not involve the validity of the statute before considering whether a statute is unconstitutional. Thus, in the Carpenter appeal the Appellate Court should have considered defendant’s reasonable doubt and due process arguments before determining that the statute creating the offense was unconstitutional. However, the requirement that the Appellate Court consider unconstitutional issues first does not require that the trial court do the same, especially where the statute creating the offense has been held unconstitutional by a court of superior jurisdiction. The court rejected the State’s argument that in the hope of avoiding a ruling on the constitutionality of the statute, the trial court was required to rule on pretrial motions although the Appellate Court had invalidated the statute creating the offense with which defendant was charged: Under either of these scenarios, the circuit court could have avoided ruling upon the constitutionality of the statute, but at the expense of defendants’ constitutional rights. We cannot emphasize enough: these are individuals charged with felonies. The criminal statutes of this state are not so sacrosanct, nor are our pursuit of judicial economy so preeminent, that we will endorse the trampling of citizens’ rights in pursuit of either. A citizen should not have to endure or defend a felony prosecution premised upon an unconstitutional statute. Our precedents do not hold otherwise. People v. Carpenter, Garibaldi & Montes-Medina, 228 Ill.2d 250, 888 N.E.2d 105 (2008) (Nos. 103616, 103856 & 103857, 4/17/08) [emphasis added] 7. Issues of constitutionality of statutes have been considered by the Illinois Supreme Court, which has stated specific guidelines concerning analysis of constitutionality: Statutes enjoy a presumption of constitutionality. [People v. Kitch, 239 Ill. 2d 452, 466 (2011);] Conlan, 189 Ill.2d at 291, 244 Ill.Dec. 350, 725 N.E.2d 1237. The party challenging the validity of a statute bears the burden of clearly establishing the alleged constitutional violation. People v. Williams, 143 Ill.2d 477, 481, 160 Ill.Dec. 437, 577 N.E.2d 762 (1991). While this presumption certainly does not mean that statutes are unassailable, neither should courts lightly or cavalierly declare unconstitutional that which the representatives of the people have seen fit to enact. Conlan, 189 Ill.2d at 291-92, 244 Ill.Dec. 350, 725 N.E.2d 1237. It is our duty to strike down legislation that plainly violates the constitution. Williams, 143 Ill.2d at 481, 160 Ill.Dec. 437, 577 N.E.2d 762, quoting People v. Lindner, 127 Ill.2d 174, 184, 129 Ill.Dec. 64, 535 N.E.2d 829 (1989). This is especially true when the legislation affects an individual’s liberty or constitutional due process rights. The due process clause provides heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests. U.S. Const., amend. XIV; Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 2; In re M.H., 196 Ill.2d 356, 362, 256 Ill.Dec. 297, 751 N.E.2d 1134 (2001), quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719-20, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 2267, 138 L.Ed.2d 772, 787 (1997). Although the legislature has wide discretion in prescribing penalties for defined criminal offenses, this discretion is limited by the constitutional guarantee that a person may not be deprived of liberty without due process of law. People v. Reed, 148 Ill.2d 1, 11, 169 Ill.Dec. 282, 591 N.E.2d 455 (1992). Although our inquiry in this case involves matters of criminal procedure rather than criminal penalties, the importance of protecting constitutional due process rights is not diminished. [emphasis added] People v. Purcell, 2002 IL 92739 8. Judicial notice is given that the constitution gives citizens certain due process rights including the liberty right to be free of arrest and prosecution unless there is probable cause and due process. Fourth Amendment Probable Clause Cause and Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clauses 9. Citizens also have a First Amendment right to challenge the constitutionality of statutes on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others. “Overbreadth is a judicially created doctrine which recognizes an exception to the established principle that a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied will not be heard to challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, in other situations not before the court. Under the doctrine, a party being prosecuted for speech or expressive conduct may challenge the law on its face if it reaches protected expression, even when that person’s own activities are not protected by the first amendment. The reason for this special rule in first amendment cases is apparent: an overbroad statute might serve to chill protected speech. A person contemplating protected activity might be deterred by the fear of prosecution. The doctrine reflects the conclusion that the possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that protected speech of others may be muted.” Pooh Bah, 224 Ill. 2d at 435-36. 10. Citizens also have a right to challenge a statute based on violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The Equal Protection Clause requires more of a state law than nondiscriminatory application within the class it establishes. It also imposes a requirement of some rationality in the nature of the class singled out. To be sure, the constitutional demand is not a demand that a statute necessarily apply equally to all persons. ‘The Constitution does not require things which are different in fact . . . to be treated in law as though they were the same.’ Hence, legislation may impose special burdens upon defined classes in order to achieve permissible ends. But the Equal Protection Clause does require that, in defining a class subject to legislation, the distinctions that are drawn have ‘some relevance to the purpose for which the classification is made’. Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 92 S.Ct. 479, 30 L.Ed.2d 502 (1971) quoting Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 308-309, 86 S.Ct. 149, 16 L.Ed.2d 577 [emphasis added] 11. For example, in People v. Wick (1985), 107 Ill.2d 62, 89 Ill.Dec. 833, 481 N.E.2d 676, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the former aggravated arson statute was unconstitutional because it (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 38, par. 20-1.1(a)(3)) violated due process because it did not bear a reasonable relationship to the public interest intended to be protected. (Wick, 107 Ill.2d at 67, 89 Ill.Dec. 833, 481 N.E.2d 676.) The Illinois Supreme Court noted that the purpose of the statute was to subject arsonists to a more severe penalty when their conduct resulted in injury to a fire fighter or police officer. The Illinois Supreme Court found, however, that the statute was not reasonably related to that objective because the statute did not require an unlawful purpose in setting the fires. The statute therefore swept too broadly by punishing innocent as well as culpable conduct in setting fires. Wick, 107 Ill.2d at 66, 89 Ill.Dec. 833, 481 N.E.2d 676. 12. A statute may also be challenged if it violates the proportionate penalties clause of our State constitution. (Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 11.) In People v. Bailey, 167 Ill.2d 210, 657 N.E.2d 953 (1995), 212 Ill.Dec. 608 the court stated as follows: Moreover, as this court has previously stated, “the availability of different punishments for separate offenses based on the commission of the same acts does not offend the constitutional guarantees of equal protection or due process.” [citations omitted] Accordingly, the trial court erred in concluding that the stalking statute violated the proportionate penalties clause.. . . .All penalties are to be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship. (Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 11.) While this court has acknowledged that article I, section 11, places some restraint on the right of the legislature to establish penalties for crimes, this court has been reluctant to invalidate penalties prescribed by the legislature, since, institutionally, the legislature is better able to gauge the evils affecting our society and more capable of measuring the seriousness of various offenses than the courts. (Accordingly, this court will only invalidate a penalty when it is “`cruel,’ `degrading’ or `so wholly disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock the moral sense of the community.'” [citations omitted]. People v. Bailey, 167 Ill.2d 210, 657 N.E.2d 953 (1995), 212 Ill.Dec. 608 [emphasis added] 13. In Bailey, the Illinois Supreme Court stated that if a statute makes the bail amount mandatory it would violate separation of powers: Coyne [the defendant] also argues that section 110-6.3 violates the separation of powers doctrine because it encroaches on the authority of the judiciary to admit persons to bail. We disagree. Section 110-6.3 requires that a court hold a hearing after the State files a petition requesting that the defendant be held without bail. According to the language of the section, following a hearing, the court “may” deny bail if several enumerated factors exist. Thus, we find section 110-6.3 is discretionary, rather than mandatory, in nature and does not curtail a court’s authority to impose bail. Consequently, we find that section 110-6.3 does not impermissibly infringe upon the powers of the court to admit persons to bail. [citations omitted] People v. Bailey, 167 Ill.2d 210, 657 N.E.2d 953 (1995), 212 Ill.Dec. 608 14. The percentage fee retention clause in the Bail Statute makes the percentage fee for bond processing disparate in that it is related to the bail set and therefore, also related to the crime charged – therefore appears to be an act of fraud and extortion against those with high bonds having no relationship, in amount, to the actual act of bond processing by the Clerk’s Office, is discriminatory against a specific class of defendants who can by some means raise the cash to pay 10 % bail charge for bond, on a higher than $500 bail (minimum bail amount), without using stocks, bonds, or real estate or paying the entire bail, and mandatory with absence of due process as there is no pretrial evidentiary hearing prior to its implementation. It violates separation of powers as, being a penalty as it is tied to the offense charged, is set by the legislature and not the court. As a penalty it violates the Bill of Rights in that property is confiscated without due process of law, especially as the amount charged is disparate regarding both different charges and the same charge with different bail amounts dependent upon the order of the judge. 15. Shelton argues that by the Bail Statute causing retainer of 1 % of her bail ($3,000) and not a flat fee for service regardless of ability to pay, regardless if bail is decreased upon motion for reconsideration (for the amount refunded – which the court clerk in Cook County refuses to refund the difference until the final disposition and then still retains the 1 %) as well as guilt or innocence, she is denied of property and liberty (until bail paid) without due process of law (there is no evidentiary due process hearing or trial that justifies the court retaining disproportionate and discriminatory different fees for different defendants). It is not a flat fee that applies equally to all persons using the clerk’s bond processing and holding service. 16. Therefore, Shelton has the right to “challenge the constitutionality of statutes on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others”. She challenges the disparate bond retention statute because it is discriminatory against a class of defendants who can by some means raise the cash to pay a higher than $500 bail, yet do not have the stocks, bonds, or real estate to put up as surety nor can they pay the entire bail amount. Those defendants that are indigent, particularly if innocent and therefore theoretically subject to no fines, fees or penalties, and have set high bails are particularly denied equal protection and due process by targeting them for lack of liberty if they do not forfeit a large sum of money without any evidentiary due process hearing as to their ability to pay or the justice involved in confiscating their funds. They are therefore coerced into giving up their right to retain property unless given a due process hearing in order to secure their pretrial release. This should shock the conscience. 17. Shelton challenges the constitutionality of the disparate fees because this represents fraud in that it charges different fees for the same service and ties the fee not to the service, but to an unrelated criminal charge and the whim of a judge or a judicial bond chart, not unlike the Medicare Fraud federal laws that charge felony fraud when a doctor’s billing agent charges by percentage of a doctor’s income instead of a flat fee for their services thus tying their services to the charges to the federal government for the doctor’s services. Here the county is committing fraud upon the defendants by tying the amount of bail and type of charge to the clerk’s fee. 18. Shelton challenges the constitutionality of the percentage bail retention clause because in violation of proportionality there is clearly no relationship between the amount of the clerk’s fee to process and hold the bond and the purpose of the bail statute or the Illinois Criminal Code. 19. Shelton challenges the constitutionality of the percentage bail retention clause (actually a penalty as the amount is related to the offense charged and whim of the judge and not the actual service) because it violates separation of powers as it is mandatory and unrelated in amount to an actual service of bond processing and holding or the purpose of the Bail or Criminal Statutes. The court is divorced from this bond processing fee penalty upon defendants whether guilty or innocent. Disparate mandatory bail fees encroache on the authority of the judiciary to admit persons to bail as it places the decision on the defendant as to whether to give up their right to property without due process (a decision of judiciary) in order to obtain pretrial release and the legislature which sets the amount of the penalty/alleged fee. 20. The Illinois Supreme Court said it “will only invalidate a penalty when it is “`cruel,’ `degrading’ or `so wholly disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock the moral sense of the community.'”” [citations omitted] People v. Bailey, 167 Ill.2d 210, 657 N.E.2d 953 (1995), 212 Ill.Dec. 608 The Bail Statute requiring one person to pay $1,000 or even ten times more as a bond processing fee while others pay $10 for the same service does shock the moral sense of the community and is not only disproportionate to the offense, in many different situations, but particularly in this case where defendant is simply charged with “touching an officer’s ear”, especially as the act of bond processing is wholly unrelated to the purpose of the Bail Statute as well as the purpose of the Criminal Statute used to charge aggravated battery for this fraudulently alleged offense. Should a penalty without due process on Shelton be the same or even more than on another defendant who shot an officer with a gun? 21. The U.S. Supreme Court previously ruled that a fee for bail processing services applied equally to both innocent and guilty defendants alike is not a penalty. The U.S. Supreme Court held that: “No due process denial results from retention of the 1% charge, which is an administrative fee (and not a cost of prosecution), imposed on all—guilty and innocent alike—who seek its benefit” (Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 92 S.Ct. 479, 30 L.Ed.2d 502 (1971)), but nowhere in their opinion did they consider the disparate nature of the bond processing fee as applied to different cases. They held that: “There is no indication that the personal recognizance system is not used without regard to the economic status of the accused, or that the full-deposit system actually favors the affluent” (Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 92 S.Ct. 479, 30 L.Ed.2d 502 (1971)), having stated in their opinion that courts would use personal recognizance for indigent defendants frequently and would consider the financials of defendants before setting bail. However, in this case, defendant is indigent and there was no personal recognizance bond and there was no consideration of Shelton’s financials when bond was set for over 1 ½ years. There was no evidentiary due process hearing with notice to object to the bond retention amount. This is an issue of first impression ignored by the U.S. Supreme Court in the Schilb opinion. 22. As disparate service fees cannot be considered as a true service fee – or this would be an act of fraud and because they appear to be tied to the actual crime charged and bail set, they must be considered a mandatory penalty being charged on the group of defendants whether innocent or guilty who happened to be charged with a criminal offense, yet have the finances, by whatever cash means (their own or borrowed) – except stocks, bonds, or real estate, to pay the bail above and beyond the minimum for any criminal offense. As noted in Bailey and Schilb, there is a violation of both equal protection and proportionality when the penalty is mandatory or has no relationship to the crime and due process was denied. 23. Therefore, although flat fee bond processing fee on all defendants, whether innocent or guilty, who use the clerk’s bond processing service would be constitutional, it is apparent that a percentage of bail, bond service fee is not constitutional. WHEREFORE, Shelton moves for this Court to declare the portion of the bail statute allowing retention of 10 % of the bond by the Clerk (Bond Retention Clause) as unconstitutional. Under penalties as provided by law pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/109-1 I certify that the statements set forth herein are true and correct. July 29, 2014 Respectfully submitted, Linda L. Shelton Pro Se Defendant Linda Lorincz Shelton, Ph.D., M.D. Read the rest of this entry »
Mass support for Shelton in court and in letter writing campaign to stop retaliation against whistle blower
Encourage the press to cover this story of judicial bribery, judicial incompetence or maliciousness, wholesale violation of civil rights in Cook County Courts, and retaliation against a whistle blower.
Come to courtroom 506 2600 S California Ave, Chicago, IL, 10:00 AM on March. 26, 2015 and every hearing date after this for case 12 CR 22504, where whistle blower and disabled defendant, Dr. Linda Shelton is on trial, having been illegal charged in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act for allegedly “touching an officer’s ear and pulling hair” during a PTSD flashback where she cowers, is confused, believes she is being beaten up, and swings her arms around her head to try and protect herself. The officers were informed about her flashbacks and to “back-off” as recommended by her psychiatrist during the flashbacks until she “recovers her equilibrium”, but instead grabbed her, literally lifting her off the ground, and then when she touched the officer innocently, likely due to her medical problems including serious lack of balance and the PTSD, Sheriff staff took advantage of the vague and likely unconstitutional Illinois battery statute to charge Shelton with FELONY battery, which could carry a sentence of 3 to 14 years in prison. This is outrageous, immoral, and unconstitutional. A large grass roots effort is needed to challenge this outrage. The following is repeated on Shelton’s Facebook page here. Mass public pressure needed for justice and to fight government corruption and attacks on whistle blower.PLEASE WRITE THE SUGGESTED LETTER TO THE FOLLOWING OFFICIALS! You know that I expose corruption in Illinois and Cook County, particularly family, probate, and criminal courts, through my web sites including: https://cookcountyjudges.wordpress.com, http://chicagofbi.wordpress.com, http://illinoiscorruption.blogspot.com, and http://prosechicago.wordpress.com. There has been a ten year attack against me in retaliation for above and I need public support in a huge way. PLEASE WRITE THESE PEOPLE AND ASK THEM TO INVESTIGATE – SUGGESTED LETTER FOLLOWS: Asst. US Attorney Zachary T. Fardon United States Attorney’s Office Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division 219 S. Dearborn St., 5th Floor Chicago, IL 60604 Phone: (312) 353-5300 ______________________ U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division & Public Corruption Division 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Disability Rights – NYAV Washington, D.C. 20530 ______________________ FBI,Special Agent in Charge – Chicago Robert J. Holley 2111 W. Roosevelt Road Chicago, IL 60608 Phone: (312) 421-6700 Fax: (312) 829-5732/38 E-mail: Chicago@ic.fbi.gov _________________________ Illinois State Police Hiram Grau, Director 801 South 7th Street Suite 1100 – S Springfield, IL 62703 Email: firstname.lastname@example.org, ___________________________ Senator Durbin WASHINGTON, D.C. 711 Hart Senate Bldg. Washington, DC 20510 9 am to 6 pm ET (202) 224-2152 – phone (202) 228-0400 – fax ____________________ Senator Kirk Washington, DC 524 Hart Senate Office Building Washington DC, 20510 Phone: 202-224-2854 Fax: 202-228-4611 ___________________ Congressman Lipinsky Washington, D.C. Office 1717 Longworth HOB Washington, DC 20515 P (202) 225 – 5701 P (866) 822 – 5701 F (202) 225 – 1012 And ask them to help me to make an appointment with an investigator in the FBI/US Attorney’s offices to file criminal complaints. I need mass involvement in order to obtain justice. My property and home, as well as father’s estate for which I am trustee were all stolen to destroy me and shut me up as whistle blower. I live in Oak Lawn, IL. SUGGESTED LETTER: Please help Linda Shelton to make appointments with the FBI and U. S. Attorney to deal with corrupt judges in Cook County, corrupt peace officers, numerous false arrests in retaliation for her whistle blowing and in violation of the American with Disabilities Act. Her issues cross state lines and expose corruption at the highest political levels in Illinois. She has helped many of us in exposing corruption in the family courts, probate courts, and criminal courts and now she needs our help! She is disabled and her illnesses are making it harder for her to act alone. The theft of her home and money is outrageous and was done by those who had her falsely arrested to get her out of the way so they could do their evil and illegal acts. The situation involves: 1) forgery and fraud upon the court in making a fraudulent deathbed trust. Illegal eviction without the sheriff using the Oak Lawn Police – who knew they could not evict without the Sheriff in an eviction case which was DISMISSED – while the eviction case was pending – now they won’t let her into her house without threat of arrest and are selling the house 2) Theft of her personal property and a $2 million estate for which she is trustee transferred to a person in New Jersey and to unscrupulous attorneys taking advantage of this mentally ill person in New Jersey to convert it to attorney fees. 3) Bribery of a probate judge to write an order saying they own the property and can evict her – when ONLY a forcible entry and detainer action can evict someone – or it is an unlawful lockout, breaking and entering, trespass, wrongful conveyance, theft, etc. The probate judge made orders in the probate case on the issue of a trust – which was not before him so he had no jurisdiction!!! This is criminal action by that judge. 4) False arrest for “touching an officer’s ear” during a PTSD flashback TRIGGERED PURPOSELY BY SHERIFF STAFF – thus a charge of FELONY battery to an officer where they are seeking a 3-14 yr sentence! Shelton is disabled and had a court disability coordinator agreement that the officers would not use info given them to trigger a flashback and if there was a flashback, they would back off while Shelton was confused, cried, cowered and appeared terrified. Instead they grabbed her and carried her to jail, charging her with this fraudulent felony. They are the criminals for violating the agreement. Battery requires intent and they knew there was no intent during a flashback as she was confused and having an altered state of consciousness consistent with a flashback – where she relives in a dream like state attack against her by police where she went into a respiratory arrest. She need an officer to obtain search warrants and recover her property. Can you ask the FBI and US Attorney to investigate and to assist as it involves a person in New Jersey – thus crime crosses state lines! Shelton has documentary evidence to prove all of the above. Of course, the Oak Lawn police won’t arrest themselves. THANK YOU TO ANYONE WHO WRITES, ATTENDS COURT HEARINGS, OR HELPS ME AND OTHERS FIGHTING COURT CORRUPTION IN ANY WAY! Linda Shelton [ https://cookcountyjudges.wordpress.com/2013/03/13/ardc-claims-contributing-to-judges-campaign-committee-to-influence-a-decision-is-not-bribery-what-do-you-think/ ] [ https://cookcountyjudges.wordpress.com/2012/11/09/better-business-bureau-complaint-against-peck-bloom-llc-law-firm-and-judge-james-riley-for-corruption/ ] [ https://cookcountyjudges.wordpress.com/2014/05/11/shelton-wrongfully-jailed-for-one-year-recently-released/ ] [ http://chicagofbi.wordpress.com/2012/09/02/fbi-ignores-extensive-pervasive-greylord-like-corruption-in-the-circuit-court-of-cook-county/ ] [ https://cookcountyjudges.wordpress.com/2012/11/20/dishonorable-judge-peggy-chiampas-illegally-arrests-defendant-for-getting-sick-in-courtroom/ ] They also arrested her on an invalid warrant on a case she won the year before, despite her showing them the court order quashing the warrant! [ http://illinoispolice.wordpress.com/2012/07/11/oak-lawn-police-kowingly-arrest-shelton-on-invalid-warrants-in-act-of-criminal-contempt-of-court/ ] [http://cookcountysheriffdeputies.wordpress.com/2009/06/06/deputy-rebecca-doran-deputy-maureen-caliendo-sergeant-patricia-mccollum-assistant-chief-kevin-lyons/ ] Shelton’s Advocacy against corrupt county courts includes blog posts like this: https://cookcountyjudges.wordpress.com/2013/01/11/court-abuse-of-parents-and-children-in-child-custody-and-support-cases-please-contact-cook-county-board-now/ https://cookcountyjudges.wordpress.com/2012/11/26/u-s-supreme-court-approves-elimination-of-right-to-petition-for-habeas-corpus-right-to-have-witnesses-at-trial-and-other-constitutional-rights-in-cook-county/ http://prosechicago.wordpress.com/2014/05/20/cook-county-court-clerk-misconduct-and-incompetence-letter-to-cook-county-board-president/
The Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board said it is not a bribe.
It happened in my case with Judge Riley – read here.