Posts Tagged ‘Annabel Melongo’
U.S. Supreme Court refuses to uphold its own holdings and due process
The U.S. Supreme Court refused to uphold their own holdings in denial of Shelton’s Petition for Writ of Mandamus. Dr. Linda Shelton was unlawfully convicted of contempt of court and summarily sentenced to 16 months in jail with no trial or due process because she followed Illinois law that allows a person other than the defendant to file a next-friend petition for writ of habeas corpus on “behalf of another”. Judge McHale held that it was illegal for Shelton to file this petition on behalf of Annabel Melongo when Shelton was not an attorney. Melongo was released after 20 months when the Illinois eavesdropping law was declared unconstitutional. Melongo had been denied hearing on Shelton’s petition for her in an illegal act by Cook County judges who refused to hear this petition. Thus they violated the U.S. Constitution Suspension Clause that says that habeas may not be suspended except in times of war. READ THE FOLLOWING!! (Transcript where Shelton appeared before Judge McHale asking for him to assign judge to represent Melongo on Shelton’s next-friend petition for writ of habeas corpus on her behalf on May 11, 2010 – NOTE: habeas corpus is the highest right a person has in the U.S. written in the constitution to protect against unlawful incarceration yet few Americans are educated to know what this means!)
Shelton alleges Judge McHale (substituting for Judge Biebel – presiding judge of the Cook County Criminal Court) illegally and in an act of felony federal treason and conspiracy to violate rights under color of law, after stating he would not hear her petition (i.e. admitted she was before him on an administrative matter and not with him acting as a judge) in retaliation for Shelton’s whistle blowing about judicial corruption in the Circuit Court of Cook County (she had given the FBI and U.S. Attorney extensive evidence about this corruption and published it on Internet blogs), in May through November, 2010, summarily convicted her of three (3) “cases” which should have been three (3) “counts” of criminal contempt for the legal act of filing a next-friend habeas petition ,as a NON-ATTORNEY, on behalf of Annabelle Melongo, a dual Haitian/Cameroonian citizen with language difficulties and who was confusing English and Roman law, and then telling the judge that his act of ruling that a non-attorney filing was “illegal” was a violation of his oath of office to follow the law as well as a criminal act. The conviction was not only illegal, but it was retaliatory.
The fact that he stated he would not hear the petition meant that there was no case before him when he charged me with contempt and this occurred after I asked for SOJ as a right, which also means that his orders are void as he did not follow the law on SOJ.
Shelton alleges Judge McHale’s consecutive SUMMARY sentences of 4, 6, and 6 months (total of 16 months) in CCDOC with good time jail credits quashed by order of Judge McHale, were in:
A) violation of IL Substitution of Judge (“SOJ”) as Right Statutes, 735 ILCS 5/2-1001 which make all orders given after denial of this SOJ as a right void, Jiffy Lube International, Inc. v. Agarwal,2 77 Ill.App.3d 722,727, 214 Ill.Dec. 609,661 N.E.2d 463 (1996); Curtis v. Lofy, 394 Ill. App..3d 170, 176 (2009);
B) violation of Habeas Statutes, 735 ILCS Art X which allow a person to file a habeas petition on “behalf of another”;
C) violation of IL Appellate Court holding that requires a full due process jury trial if contempt sentence is summarily imposed on a day other than the day in which the contemptuous act occurred In re Marriage of Betts, 200l ll.App.3d 26 (1990); Winning Moves, Inc., v. Hi! Baby, Inc., 238 Ill. App.3d 834 (1992); Kaeding v. Collins, 28I Ill.App3d 919 (1996)
D) violation of IL sentencing statutes requiring concurrent sentences for the same conduct or acts occurring during the same state of mind, 720 ILCS 5/3-3; and
E) violation of IL statute where habeas petition must be heard quickly before the chief judge of the division, Habeas statutes, 735 ILCS 5/10-119, and the rules of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Rule 15.2(d); and
F) violation of the U.S. Supreme Court holdings and IL Court holdings which:
1) require jury trial if sentences exceed 6 months aggregate for contempt, In re Marriage of Betts, 200 lll.App.3d 26 (1990), Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966); Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 513, 94 S.Ct. at 2692 (1974); Taylor v. Hayes, supra, 418 U.S. at 495, 94 S.Ct. at 2701;
2) forbid sentencing for more than one count of contempt during one trial or case, People v. Brown, 235 Ill.App.3d 945 (1992);
3) forbid removal of automatic statutory good time jail credits by a judge – Good Time Jail Allowance statute, 730 ILCS 130, gives jurisdiction for such credits to the county sheriff and not the judge, also violation of Codispoti v. Pennsylvannia 418 U.S. 506 (1974); and
4) specifically state it is legal for a non-attorney to file a next-friend petition for writ of habeas corpus, U.S. ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 76 S.Ct 1 (1955) and Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 128 S.Ct 2229 (2008); 735 ILCS Article X.
The Illinois Appellate Court in violation of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 298 and Smith v. Bennett and Marshall v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 81 S.Ct. 895 (1961) denied my indigence petition , thus denied my appeal illegally.
The Federal District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed Shelton s Federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus regarding these three convictions, ACC 100083-01, 93-01, & 94-01, falsely stating that Shelton did not exhaust state remedies. Judge Hart ignored and violated the U.S. Supreme Court’s rulings in the line of cases Neirsheimer, Regan, and Loftus. People v. Loftus, 400 Ill. 432, 81 N.E.2d 495 (1948), (in response to order of Court in Loftus v. People of State of Illinois, 334 U.S. 804, 68 S.Ct 1212 (1948)); Woods v. Neirsheimer, 328 U.S. 211, 66 S.Ct. 996 (1946); White v. Ragen and Lutz v. Same, 324 U.S. 760, 65 S.Ct. 978 (1945); Young v. Ragen, 337 U.S. 235, 69 S.Ct. 1073 (1949).
There may be an exception to the exhaustion bar for cases involving colorable claims of actual innocence. See, e.g., House v. Bell, 47 U.S. 518, 522 (2006). This case also involves this is as since there is no possibility that filing a next-friend habeas petition is illegal or that complaining, as a litigant to a judge that he is violating the law, when he is violating the law, is illegal, there is no possibility that Shelton is actually guilty of contempt.
These sentences by Judge McHale were acts of felony treason, a violation of 18 U.S.C. §2381, punishable by a sentence of 20 yrs. to life, per previous holdings and/or dicta of the United States Supreme Court including:
1) that the judges in U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980) affirmed the statement of Chief Justice Marshall in Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 5 L.Ed 257 (1821) that it is “treason on the constitution” when a judge “usurps [the jurisdiction] that which is not given”; and
2) that it is a “war on the constitution” when a judge violates his oath of office to support it [including supporting statutes of a state = due process], Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 78 S.Ct. 1401(1958).
Judge McHale’s knowing violation of the statutes concerning petitions for writ of habeas corpus, SOJ as a right, good conduct jail credits; concurrent sentencing for the same act; violation of case law concerning right to trial if sentence is > 6 mo, right to trial if sentence for contempt is given out on day other than day of contempt incidence, ban on more than one count of contempt during one case or trial; and violation of U.S. Supreme Court holdings/dicta in U.S. ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 76 S.Ct 1 (1955) and Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 128 S.Ct 2229 (2008) that a non-attorney may file a next-friend habeas petition prove Judge McHale illegally found Linda Shelton in contempt three times, illegally sentenced her, and knowingly did this in an act of treason, violating Shelton’s constitutional rights to be free of arrest and imprisonment without due process and in violation of law, denied her father’s need for her caretaker, companion, and executive assistant services and love in his final days in an act of cruelty and lawlessness, and denied Shelton’s need for medical care and proper diet.
In addition, Annabelle Melongo’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, filed by Shelton, has been ignored by Judges McHale, (Brosnahan, Wadas, Kazmierski – to whom Plaintiff presented habeas filing prior to presenting it to Judge McHale and all of whom refused to hear it stating that they have no jurisdiction to hear filings from a non-attorney on behalf of another, despite Plaintiff reading the IL habeas statute to them), and Judge Biebel and she is still in jail a year later! All these judges have therefore committed treason. This is a grotesque and extremely serious violation of the Constitution of the United States – suspension clause (Article I, section 9) which states that the Great Writ of Habeas Corpus may not be suspended except in time of war.
Judge McHale was fully informed in open court by Plaintiff of the case law, code, and constitutional issues stated herein and therefore cannot claim mistake or unintentional error. Plaintiff therefore now petitions the U.S. Attorney and U.S. Justice Department to pursue the violations of 18 U.S.C §241 AND 18 U.S.C §242, as well as 18 U.S.C. §2381 that are clearly documented in this document and attachments, under the jurisdiction as permitted by the Presentment Clause of the Constitution and under 18 U.S.C. §3332 – which specifically states, as is supported by case law, that a citizen with evidence of federal crimes may petition a judge to present this evidence to a special grand jury . I ask that the Justice Department bring this cause before a judge for an indictment against Judge McHale for corruption.
Judge McHale ILLEGALLY AND UNCONSTITUTIONALLY IN VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER COLOR OF LAW incarcerated Shelton for 16 month summary sentence for which she served six months and during that time DISCRIMINATED AGAINST DR. SHELTON’S DYING FATHER, ALLAN LORINCZ, BY ILLEGALLY JAILING SHELTON, SNUBBING HER REQUEST FOR HOUSE ARREST TO CARE FOR HER FATHER, AND PREVENTING HER FROM CARING FOR HIM IN HIS LAST DAYS AS HE REQUESTED RESULTING IN HIS DEATH from self-starvation and dehydration due to depression over his loss of his caretaker and companion, Shelton and his progressing Parkinson’s disease. By turning a deaf ear, HE DISCRIMINATED AGAINST DISABLED SHELTON IN IGNORING HER DISABILITY NEEDS WHILE UNLAWFULLY JAILED BY HIM, in that he refused to order the Sheriff to provide her appropriate medications and food for her conditions. He, IN RETALIATION FOR HER WHISTLE BLOWING AND COMPLAINTS AGAINST JUDGES AND SHERIFF STAFF, ILLEGALLY JAILED HER knowingly and willingly suspended her right to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, violated at least four U.S. Supreme Court holdings by unlawfully convicting her of contempt and summarily sentencing her to 16 mo. in jail, and trashed Shelton’s due process constitutional rights, as well as numerous Illinois statutes and Supreme Court and Cook County Court rules. Finally, he ordered a fitness exam when there was no reason to, in order to help justify his illegal conduct but ignored Shelton’s attorney’s motion that a person cannot be found in contempt if the judge questions their fitness as contempt requires intent and allegation of lack of fitness precludes concept of intent.
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See the following criminal cases, appeals, motions for habeas & mandamus – which are explained in the following:
Cook County Court Habeas Petition: 09 CH 12736 – renumbered after transfer from Chancery division to criminal division to 09MR00025 (Shelton’s next friend habeas petition for Maisha Hamilton – allowed and Hamilton assigned a pro bono attorney); 10 HC 0006 & 7 (Shelton’s next-friend habeas petitions for Melongo – Judge McHale refused to hear, told Shelton filing it was criminal); 10 HC 00008 & 12 (Shelton habeas petition – Judge Porter summarily denied)
Cook County Criminal Contempt Cases: ACC 1000083-01, ACC 1000093-01, ACC 1000094-01 (Unconstitutional & Illegal against Shelton – summary total sentence of 16 months for filing next-friend habeas petitions for Melongo and defending her right to do so)
Cook County Criminal Cases: 10CR8092 (Melongo’s criminal eavesdropping case – declared unconstitutional eavesdropping law – this was upheld by IL Supreme Court) 08CR1050201 (Melongo’s computer tampering case which she later won as State committed fraud)
U.S. Supreme Court Complaint for Leave to File Mandamus: 12-6561 (Shelton pro se filing, granted in forma pauperis but denied leave to file brief)
Illinois Appellate Court: 10-3342, 10-3344, 10-3345 (Shelton’s appeal of contempt cases dismissed when denied in forma pauperis and demanded back payment for previous cases as well as $25 payment for each of these cases)
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NOTE: the following case law
CONTEMPT
Sacher et al. v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 72 S.Ct. 451, 96 L.Ed. 717 (1950)
Courage does not equal contempt.
An attorney has the right to make a fearless, vigorous argument
It is the right of counsel for every litigant to press his claim, even if it appears farfetched and untenable to obtain the trial court’s considered ruling. Full enjoyment of that right, wit due allowance for the heat of controversy, will be protected by appellate courts when infringed by trial courts. At 9
Men who make their way to the bench sometimes exhibit vanity, irascibility, narrowness, arrogance, and other weaknesses [ignorance] to which human flesh is heir. Most judges, however, recognize and respect courageous, forthright lawyerly conduct. They rarely mistake overzeal or heated words of a man fired with a desire to win, for the contemptuous conduct which defies rulings and deserves punishment. They recognize that our profession necessarily is a contentious one and they respect the lawyer who makes a strenuous effort for his client. At 12
Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, Footnote 4, 88 S.Ct. 1477, 20 .Ed.2d 522 (1968)
The court has long recognized the potential for abuse in exercising the summary power to imprison for contempt—it is an ‘arbitrary’ power which is ‘liable to abuse.’ Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 313, 9 S.Ct. 77, 82, 32 L.Ed. 405 (1888). ‘(I)ts exercise is a delicate one, and care is needed to avoid arbitrary or oppressive conclusions.’ Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 539, 45 S.Ct. 390, 396, 69 L.Ed. 767 (1925).4
Footnote 4. ‘That contempt power over counsel, summary or otherwise, is capable of abuse is certain. Men who make their way to the bench sometimes exhibit vanity, irascibility, narrowness, arrogance, and other weaknesses to which human flesh is heir.’ Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 12, 72 S.Ct. 451, 456, 96 L.Ed. 717 (1952). See also Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U.S. 378, 39 S.Ct. 337, 63 L.Ed. 656 (1919); Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 61 S.Ct. 810, 85 L.Ed. 1172 (1941); Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S. 399, 76 S.Ct. 456, 100 L.Ed. 474 (1956).
United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1972).
[T]he conduct so personally involved the trial judge that the contempt hearing should be presented before another judge. “Attorneys have a right to be persistent, vociferous, contentious, and imposing, even to the point of appearing obnoxious, when acting in their client’s behalf.” In the matter of Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389, 400 (7th Circ. 1972)
Sentences more than six months either separate or aggregate require a jury trial:
When the aggregate punishments for a particular course of criminally contemptuous conduct committed in the presence of a judge exceed the parameters of punishments normally imposed for misdemeanors and the punishments are not imposed immediately after occurrence of the contemptuous conduct, the contemnor is entitled to a jury trial as to the contempt charges. The traditional test for determining whether or not a charged offense is a misdemeanor is whether the penalties exceed $500 or six months imprisonment. Where, as with criminal contempt in Illinois, no maximum punishment is prescribed for an offense, courts look to the penalty actually imposed to determine whether an offense is so serious that a jury trial was required. Some decisions suggest that in the context of contempt proceedings, the $500 fine component.., is subject to upward adjustment based on the contemnor’s financial resources and inflationary trends. In re Marriage of Betts, 200 Ill. App. 3d 26, 50, 558 N.E.2d 404 (4th Dist. 1990).
The following are holdings in Maita v. Whitmore, 508 F.2d 143 (9th Cir. 1975):
[Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 94 S.Ct. 2697, 41 L.Ed.2d 897, and Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 94 S.Ct. 2687, 41 L.Ed.2d 912.]
First: The rules as to whether an ordinary criminal offense is ‘petty,’ thus not requiring a jury trial, or ‘serious,’ thus requiring a jury trial, also apply to charges of criminal contempt. Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, supra, 418 U.S. at 513, 94 S.Ct. at 2692; Taylor v. Hayes, supra, 418 U.S. at 495, 94 S.Ct. at 2701.
Second: ‘Crimes carrying more than six month sentences are serious crimes and those carrying less are petty crimes.’ (Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, supra, 418 U.S. at 512, 94 S.Ct. at 2691; Taylor v. Hayes, supra, 418 U.S. at 495, 94 S.Ct. at 2701.
Third: ‘Judgment about the seriousness of the crime is normally heavily influenced by the penalty authorized by the legislature.’ Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, supra, 418 U.S. at 511, 94 S.Ct. at 2691. Indeed, if the penalty authorized by the legislature exceeds six months, there is a right to a jury trial, even though the judge could impose a sentence of six months or less. Baldwin v. New York, 1970, 399 U.S. 66, 68-69, 90 S.Ct. 1886, 26 L.Ed.2d 437, and cases there cited.
Fourth: Where the legislature has not prescribed a penalty, as is often the case when the charge is criminal contempt, the actual sentence imposed determines whether the offense is ‘serious’ or ‘petty.’ Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, supra, 418 U.S. 512, 94 S.Ct. 2687 at 2691; Taylor v. Hayes, supra, 418 U.S. at 495, 94 S.Ct. at 2701. In such a case, when multiple contempts are tried together, the imposition of consecutive sentences aggregating more than six months makes the offenses ‘serious’ and requires a jury trial. Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, supra, 418 U.S. at 516-518, 94 S.Ct. at 2693-2694. On the other hand, where there are convictions for several contempts but the aggregate sentence does not exceed six months because the sentences are concurrent, jury trial is not required. Taylor v. Hayes, supra, 418 U.S. at 496, 94 S.Ct. at 2702. Moreover, it makes no difference that the trial judge at first imposes consecutive sentences totalling more than six months, if he afterward reduces them to six month sentences to be served concurrently; jury trial is not required. Id. at 496, 94 S.Ct. at 2702.
Dr Shelton asks U.S. Supreme Court to appoint special master to remove corruption in Circuit Court of Cook County
On this site and in their pleadings before the Circuit Court of Cook County, the Illinois Appellate Court and the Illinois Supreme Court, Dr. Linda Shelton, Dr. Sheila Mannix, David Bambic, Milijana Vlastelica, Frank Epstein, Sandra Padron, Karyn Mehringer, Mic Gerhardt, Maisha Hamilton, Vernon Glass, Naomi Jennings, Annabel Melongo, Davy Cady and many others have shown that the Circuit Court of Cook County has allowed its judges to disregard constitutional rights such as due process, speedy trial, the right to petition for writ of habeas corpus, the right to receive notice and discovery before trial, the right to have enforced state laws as to trial and court procedure, and the right to confront witnesses against them and not have court decision made based on hearsay.
The extreme lawlessness that Shelton has documented on this site is now before the United States Supreme Court in three Petitions for Certiorari and for Mandamus and five more are in preparation. You can read them in the links at the end of this post.
In the pleadings that follow, David Bambic and Linda Shelton are asking the United States Supreme Court to review this extreme lawlessness that has caused wrongful decisions in their cases, but that also is so pervasive that hundreds if not thousands of divorce cases, orders of protection cases, criminal cases, probate cases, and child custody cases must be overturned or retried.
The state of anarchy in Cook County due to judicial ignorance, corruption, misconduct, arrogance, and maliciousness is so extreme, so harmful to children, families, the elderly, and innocent accused of crimes particularly whistle blowers who are being retaliated against, as documented in these three U.S. Supreme Court proceedings that Shelton has requested the U.S. Supreme Court to appoint a special master to review the policies and procedures of the Circuit Court of Cook County and to institute a judicial education and supervision program so that the right to petition for writ of habeas corpus, the right for a speedy trial, the right to compulsory process, the right to notice and discovery before trial, as well as other rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights including due process or following the statutes and rules of the state and the federal codes and rules are preserved and no longer violated pervasively.
Shelton now calls for Cook County Board President Tony Preckwinkle to fire Chief Judge Timothy Evans for failure to ensure that the judges in the Circuit Court of Cook County follow the Constitutions of the United States and Illinois and the laws of the State of Illinois and these United States.
We can no longer allow this pervasive, malignant lawlessness to run our courts in Cook County and be steered by the corrupt government officials and police officials that have been doing so.
Judge Kenneth J. Wadas illegally dismisses habeas petition – an act of treason
Judge Kenneth J. Wadas, as acting presiding criminal court judge, on May 8, 2010 illegally dismissed a petititon for writ of habeas corpus without reading it or hearing any argument, stating that only the Defendant’s attorney could file it. Next friend Linda Shelton filed it on behalf of Annabel Melongo who is being held at CCDOC without probable charge on a bogus charge. Evidence is attached to the petition proving lack of probable cause. It is the responsibility of the judge (Brosnahan) to dismiss the case after indictment if the judge is presented with evidence that there was never any probable cause. Judge Brosnahan is refusing even to hear the motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause.
Judge Wadas has violated Article X of the Code of Civil Procedure in Illinois which specifically states that another person on behalf of the petitioner may file a habeas petition.
The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that when a judge purposely violates a statute or the constitution, then he is “waring” on the constitution and commits an act of treason.
For details and case law see full article.
Judge Mary Margaret Brosnahan suspends habeas laws
Habeas corpus is the last defense a citizen has against unlawful arrest without probable cause and wrongful conviction. This “grand writ” (or the most important kind of court order) has long historical roots from pre-colonial days in England. It means that the tables are turned and the State must justify keeping a person in custody.
Originally a feature of English law, the writ of habeas corpus has historically been an important legal instrument safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary state action. When the police falsely arrest you, seize you without probable cause, jail you on charges that are not part of the penal code simply to harass and inconvenience or for political reasons, hold you in jail without charging you, refuse to release you once your sentence has been served, convict you when you are actually innocent, then this is when a person needs the “grand writ”.
The United States Constitution, guarantees a right to habeas corpus – to be brought before the court promptly and the State forced to justify why they are holding you as legal. This was re-inforced recently in the U.S. Supreme Court decision on Guantanemo Bay detainees, Boumediene v. Bush, who had been denied the right to petition for habeas corpus. The U.S. S. Ct ruled that the grand writ cannot be suspended in their case.
The United States Constitution specifically included the English common law procedure in the Suspension Clause, located in Article One, Section 9. It states:
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it.
The right to petition a court for a writ (order) of habeas corpus has long been celebrated as the most efficient safeguard of the liberty of the subject. It has been used to force a prison to release a person when their sentence is over, to force a person’s release after arrest when the State has failed to charge them in a timely fashion, and to protect a person from arbitrary and unjustified arrest and incarceration.
Illinois law mandates that a judge hear a petition for habeas corpus promptly. It can be filed by an attorney, by the prisoner, or by a “person appearing on behalf of another” AKA “next friend” under federal habeas law. There is no requirement that the prisoner be incapacitated for a next friend to file a petition for habeas corpus under Illinois law. Habeas corpus is latin and literally means “We command that you have the body [bring the person to the court]”.
The law states:
“Unless it shall appear from the complaint itself, or from the documents thereto annexed, that the party can neither be discharged, admitted to bail nor otherwise relieved, the court shall forthwith award relief by habeas corpus.” 735 ILCS 5/10-106
This order awarding relief simply means that the Sheriff holding the person in custody must bring them to the court and the state must provide documents, evidence, and witnesses that justify holding the person in custody. The court must “examine” the reasons for holding the person in custody to determine if the custody is lawful.
“Upon the return of an order of habeas corpus [bringing the body also known as the defendant to the court], the court shall, without delay, proceed to examine the cause of the imprisonment or restraint, but the examination may be adjourned from time to time as circumstances require.” 735 ILCS 5/10-119
If a judge refuses to hear a petition for habeas corpus or refuses to grant the relief (order the person to be brought before the court) there is a penalty that may be obtained from the judge.
“Any judge empowered to grant relief by habeas corpus who shall corruptly refuse to grant the relief when legally applied for in a case where it may lawfully be granted, or who shall for the purpose of oppression unreasonably delay the granting of such relief shall, for every such offense, forfeit to the prisoner or party affected a sum not exceeding $1,000.” 735 ILCS 5/10-106
The Illinois Attorney General or the State’s Attorney is required by law to prosecute the judge to collect this penalty.
“All the pecuniary forfeitures incurred under this Act shall inure to the use of the party for whose benefit the order of habeas corpus was entered, and shall be sued for and recovered with costs, by the Attorney General or State’s Attorney, in the name of the State, by complaint; and the amount, when recovered, shall, without any deduction, be paid to the party entitled thereto.” 735 ILCS 5/10-133
The Cook County Circuit Court local rule 15.2 states that “a person appearing on behalf of another” who files a petition for habeas corpus must appear “before the presiding judge.” That is how the habeas petition is initiated.
Cook County Circuit Court Rule 15.2
(c) Petitioner without funds and without attorney.
(i) If the petition states the petitioner is without funds and the petitioner is not represented by an attorney, he shall submit a verified petition to the clerk. The clerk shall docket the petition and place it on the call of the presiding judge.
(ii) If the presiding judge finds that petitioner is without an attorney and without funds, the presiding judge shall appoint an attorney to represent the petitioner.
(d) Petition on behalf of another.A person signing a petition for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of another shall appear before the presiding judge in open court and may be examined as to his interest in or relation to the person on whose behalf the petition is presented.
On April 20, 2010 Dr. Linda Shelton filed two habeas petitions on behalf of Annabel Melongo, who is being held in county jail on excessive bail without probable cause. Judge Brosnahan has refused to hear motions to quash the charges based on lack of probable cause.
The first habeas petition concerns a charge of computer tampering, where Melongo is accused of accessing the computers of Save-A-Life-Foundation (now closed) and erasing all of their financial records. Computer IP numbers are like telephone numbers and identify the computers dialed from and called. Internet provider records are like telephone company records that prove what IP (v. telephone) numbers were dialed from and called. This is an accurate record.
The forensic computer examiner, Shahna G. Monge, who supposedly worked for the Illinois Attorney General’s office has disappeared. Her report claims that Melongo had an IP address (computer address unique to Internet Service provider) from Comcast. They said that address was used to remotely access the SALF computers. Yet Melongo did not use Comcast. She had an Internet provider contract with SBC. The Illinois Attorney General’s office and the detectives on the case claim that Monge will not testify. How do they have a case against Melongo when their “expert” who claims she had evidence against Melongo won’t testify? Where is the evidence? Melongo has her SBC account bills to prove what she says and Comcast claims they have no records tied to Melongo.
A subpoena to Comcast, which the forensic computer examiner said was the Internet provider which had records of the SALF computer being tampered with produced a report from Comcast that Melongo did not have an IP computer number (address) with them and there was no record she remotely accessed the SALF IP number (address). Therefore, since the police report states that SALF IP number was accessed via Comcast from an IP number registered with Comcast, there is NO possibility that Melongo was the offender.
Melongo had a contract for Internet services through SBC. IP addresses unlike telephone numbers are UNIQUE to the Internet provider. Therefore, there is no probable cause and charging Melongo and keeping her in custody on an outrageous bail is illegal and unconstitutional and violates her civil rights. The 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that a person cannot be seized (arrested) without probable cause, nor can they be tried without probable cause.
Melongo has been going to court monthly while out on a $10,000 personal recognizance bail for three years fighting this accusation. The State has still failed to give her discovery (evidence) of the accusation that ties her with tampering with any computer. Statutory criminal procedure has not even been followed. She was at a job interview when she was supposedly arraigned. She confronted the court reporter with this fact and asked them why they falsified the court transcript saying she was there, when the attorney would testify she was not there. The attorney was so inadequate in representation that she fired him and represented herself for the last couple years.
Judge Brosnahan is so biased against Melongo (she is a dual citizen of Cameroon and Hait and has a heavy accent and writes legal papers very professionally and accurately), that she ordered a fitness exam to simply harass her (she has been declared fit after the exam) and has refused to date to have a hearing on Melongo’s motions to dismiss for lack of probable cause and fraud upon the court by the State (in claiming they have evidence when they don’t).
Melongo made a web site that details the charges, the players, and has scanned in all the evidence they gave her and the evidence she has that proves her innocence. She designed this web site as a professional information technology consultant. She has nothing to hide. The State has lots to hide!
On the web site she has posted the recordings and transcripts of phone conversations she had with the court reporter. She wanted to document what she suspected was their criminal conduct in falsely writing in the transcripts that she was in court when “arraigned” when she actually wasn’t there.
Illlinois has a felony eavesdropping law that makes it a crime to record someone without their permission. There is an exception in that if one thinks they are recording evidence of a crime, they cannot be prosecuted. Melongo wrote on her web site that she thought the court reporters had falsified records and recorded the conversations under this exception to the law. She even states so on her web site.
Now the State has arrested and incarcerate Melongo for an additional charge of eavesdropping, although it is clear the exception applies in this case so there is no probable cause.
On April 20, 2010 after her bail was revoked due to violation of bail (being arrested again) Melongo was brought before Judge Brosnahan. Judge Brosnahan was told that Melongo has no criminal background except for the pending computer tampering charge. She was told Melongo is a dual citizen of Cameroon and Haiti and has a legal visa. She was told that Melongo had diligently appeared in court at all hearings that she was informed about for three years.
The prosecutor claimed she was a huge “flight risk” because she might be illegal and therefore they contacted immigration which put a “hold” on her so they could investigate. The prosecutor said she is “dangerous” because she tampered with a computer. The defense attorney J. Nicolas Albukerk said this is all ridiculous as she has proven over three years NOT to be a flight risk and having dual citizenship does not make her a danger to anyone. Albukerk noted that having dual citizenship is not a crime and does not make anyone an illegal immigrant. He noted that none of these alleged acts were crimes of violence and the eavesdropping charge had NOTHING to do with any threats or violence.
Judge Brosnahan in an outrageous act of judicial misconduct set bail at $500,000. This violates the constitution’s requirement that bail be reasonable. Melongo is not rich. She has almost no resourcs left as no one will hire her over the last three years with a computer tampering charge pending.
A call has gone out to Camerooneans in America for assistance to fight this injustice. Judge Brosnahan has no jurisdiction in these cases as there is no probable cause. Without probable cause the charges are not valid and the indictments are void. To be held in jail on a $500,000 bail without probable cause is outrageous, illegal, unconstitutional and reveals that Judge Brosnahan is not fit to be a judge. She is continually violating the constitution and Melongo’s civil rights. She should be removed from the bench.
Judge Biebel was not available to hear the habeas petitions, so the criminal clerk called the Judge filling in for him – Judge Joseph Kazmierski. In an act of judicial misconduct Judge Kazmierski refused to hear the habeas petition and said it was “not before him” because the case was assigned to Judge Brosnahan.
Shelton went to Judge Brosnahan’s courtroom, following the clerk who brought the files to the judge. Judge Brosnahan, in an act of judicial misconduct REFUSED to hear the habeas petitions stating “you have no standing . . . only a lawyer or the defendant has standing . . . kick her out of the courtroom.” Shelton protested, trying to get this rogue and ignorant judge to read the law and follow the law, without success and was kicked out of the courtroom.
Shelton went to Judge Kazmierski and asked him to order Judge Brosnahan to hear the petitions. He refused saying he had no standing to do so. He was derelict in his duties as a judge in refusing to hear the petitions for habeas corpus. The habeas corpus petitions were new civil cases according to the Illinois Code of Civil Procedures and according to Circuit Court Rules he should have heard them and issued a habeas order to bring the defendant to court to determine if she was being legally held.
Both Judge Kazmierski and Judge Brosnahan therefore committed an act of knowingly violating statutory law which the U.S. Supreme Court has declared to be an act of treason.
Judicial Trespassers of the law
The Illinois Supreme Court has held that “if the magistrate has not such jurisdiction, then he and those who advise and act with him, or execute his process, are trespassers.” Von Kettler et.al. v. Johnson, 57 Ill. 109 (1870)
Under Federal law which is applicable to all states, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that if a court is “without authority, its judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void; and form no bar to a recovery sought, even prior to a reversal in opposition to them. They constitute no justification; and all persons concerned in executing such judgments or sentences, are considered, in law, as trespassers.” Elliot v. Piersol, 1 Pet. 328, 340, 26 U.S. 328, 340 (1828)
The Illinois Supreme Court held that if a court “could not hear the matter upon the jurisdictional paper presented, its finding that it had the power can add nothing to its authority, – it had no authority to make that finding.” The People v. Brewer, 128 Ill. 472, 483 (1928). The judges listed below had no legal authority (jurisdiction) to hear or rule on certain matters before them. They acted without any jurisdiction.
When judges act when they do not have jurisdiction to act, or they enforce a void order (an order issued by a judge without jurisdiction), they become trespassers of the law,and are engaged in treason (see below).
The Court in Yates v. Village of Hoffman Estates, Illinois, 209 F.Supp. 757 (N.D. Ill. 1962) held that “not every action by a judge is in exercise of his judicial function. … it is not a judicial function for a judge to commit an intentional tort even though the tort occurs in the courthouse.”
When a judge acts as a trespasser of the law, when a judge does not follow the law, the judge loses subject-matter jurisdiction and the judge’s orders are void, of no legal force or effect.
The U.S. Supreme Court, in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1687 (1974) stated that “when a state officer acts under a state law in a manner violative of the Federal Constitution”, he “comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States.” [Emphasis supplied in original].
By law, a judge is a state officer.The judge then acts not as a judge, but as a private individual (in his person).
Violation of judge’s oath of office
In Illinois, 705 ILCS 205/4 states “Every person admitted to practice as an attorney and counselor at law shall, before his name is entered upon the roll to be kept as hereinafter provided, take and subscribe an oath, substantially in the following form:
‘I do solemnly swear (or affirm, as the case may be), that I will support the constitution of the United States and the constitution of the state of Illinois, and that I will faithfully discharge the duties of the office of attorney and counselor at law to the best of my ability.'”
In Illinois, a judge must take a second oath of office. Under 705 ILCS 35/2 states, in part, that “The several judges of the circuit courts of this State, before entering upon the duties of their office, shall take and subscribe the following oath or affirmation, which shall be filed in the office of the Secretary of State:
‘I do solemnly swear (or affirm, as the case may be) that I will support the constitution of the United States, and the constitution of the State of Illinois, and that I will faithfully discharge the duties of judge of ______ court, according to the best of my ability.'”
Further, if the judge had enlisted in the U.S. military, then he has taken a third oath. Under Title 10 U.S.C. Section 502 the judge had subscribed to a lifetime oath, in pertinent part, as follows: “I, __________, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign or domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; …”.
The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that “No state legislator or executive or judicial officer can war against the Constitution without violating his undertaking to support it.”. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 78 S.Ct. 1401 (1958).
Any judge who does not comply with his oath to the Constitution of the United States wars against that Constitution and engages in acts in violation of the Supreme Law of the Land. The judge is engaged in acts of treason.
Having taken at least two, if not three, oaths of office to support the Constitution of the United States, and the Constitution of the State of Illinois, any judge who has acted in violation of the Constitution is engaged in an act or acts of treason (see below).
If a judge does not fully comply with the Constitution, then his orders are void, In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200 (1888)
Violating the constitution includes violating the laws of the state of Illinois as the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that when a criminal procedure is statutory, then it invokes the due process clause of the 5th amendment. Violation of the statute by the judge is a violation of federal due process. If this is intentional, then it is “waring” on the constitution.
When a judge violates the law, their orders are void, a nullity.
The law is well-settled that a void order or judgment is void even before reversal. “Courts are constituted by authority and they cannot go beyond that power delegated to them. If they act beyond that authority, and certainly in contravention of it, their judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void, and this even prior to reversal.” Vallely v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 U.S. 348, 41 S.Ct. 116 (1920)
The elements of lack of jurisdiction may include [issues pertinent to case at bar are in brackets]:
- Defective petition [indictment in case at bar is legally insufficient, as no probable cause], Brown v. VanKeuren, 340 Ill. 118, 122 (1930).
- Fraud committed in the procurement of jurisdiction [detective told grand jury that Melongo had an IP address with Comcast], Fredman Brothers Furniture v. Dept. of Revenue, 109 Ill.2d 202, 486 N.E.2d 893 (1985).
- Fraud upon the court [perjury before the grand jury and law fraudulently presented to grand jury in case at bar], In re Village of Willowbrook, 37 Ill.App.3d 393 (1962).
- The court exceeded its statutory authority [State Statutes and constitution do not allow a judge to have jurisdiction when there is no probable cause, also violation of 4th Amendment. ], Resenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 278 Supp. 794 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
- Where a complaint states no cognizable cause of action against the party [no crime as specified by statute is alleged in the fatally flawed indictment obtained through fraud as there is no probable cause], Charles v. Gore, 248 Ill.App.3d 441, 618 N.E.2d 554 (1st Dist. 1993).
- Where the public policy of the State of Illinois is violated [constitution is violated when a person is held for trial without probable cause], Martin-Tregona v. Roderick, 29 Ill.App.3d 553, 331 N.E.2d 100 (1st Dist. 1975).
Therefore, Judge Brosnahan has no jurisdiction to preside over a trial of Melongo for computer tampering or for eavesdropping because there is no probable cause and therefore no jurisdiction for a criminal case.
Treason by a judge
Whenever a judge acts where he/she does not have jurisdiction to act, the judge is engaged in an act or acts of treason. U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 216, 101 S.Ct. 471, 66 L.Ed.2d 392, 406 (1980); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L.Ed 257 (1821)
The Supreme Court has also held that if a judge wars against the Constitution, or if he acts without jurisdiction, he has engaged in treason to the Constitution.
Courts have repeatedly ruled that judges have no immunity for their criminal acts. No judge has immunity to engage in such acts.
The prosecutor is Cook County States Attorney Anita Alvarez with the assistance of the computer crimes division of the Illinois Attorney General, Lisa Madigan.
Of note: Lisa Madigan was “friends” with the director of SALF, Carol Spizzirri, and assisted her in obtaining grant money from the State of Illinois through Madigan’s father, Speaker of the Illinois House Michael Madigan. They now cannot account for most of the grant money SALF received from donors including the federal grants. Spizzirri is a know liar and commits fraud. She wrote on her applications for federal grants that she is a nurse, yet she is not a nurse. She has been labeled a pathological liar by Wisconsin courts. Her ex-husband has evidence that their now deceased daughter had an order of protection against Spizzirri.
It is thought by Melongo that they are framing her to cover up the fact that the funds from government for SALF were obtained fraudulently and they do not have financial records to account for them. How convenient to blame Melongo for remotely accessing their computers and “erasing” the data. Where’s the money Spizzirra and Madigan? The FBI has yet to arrest those involved in this fraud.
For more information see:
Cook County Judges 